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Executive Summary 
 
Good governance is based upon foresight that allows decision makers to make 
informed choices. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) has turned to strategic 
foresight to anticipate the forthcoming changes within the EU political system. The 
exercise is a second step in strategic foresight at the horizon of 2025, which follows 
the report on the future challenges facing the CoR and European local and regional 
authorities (LRAs). 
 
The aim of this second report is to address the CoR’s future role and institutional 
positioning within the European political architecture. It draws up five future-based 
scenarios with predictions about the evolution of the CoR's institutional and 
political role, its associated powers and relations with other EU institutions and 
stakeholders. For each scenario, the report analyses the consequences for the 
overall EU institutional setup, the evolution of parliamentarism, the supranational 
decision-making process and the CoR mandate. 
 
The report invites debate on the policy options for the CoR and its membership 
given the challenges ahead at the horizon of 2025. The future evolution of the 
CoR's institutional and political role necessarily involves a reflection of the impact 
of each scenario on the CoR's role in the legislative process, the checks and 
balances among and institutional prerogatives of the Council of the European 
Union, the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and national 
parliaments. 
 
Today, European integration is again at a point where choices have to be made that 
loom large over the future of the EU. In this context, the five scenarios provide a 
narrative about the future evolution of the CoR's institutional and political role. 
 
For each scenario, the report formulates recommendations in view of core choices 
that the CoR and CoR Members need to make against the background of the future 
development of the European institutional architecture. Across each of the 
independent trajectories, the scenarios underline three common and distinct 
elements. First, all scenarios implicitly assume respect for the Community method. 
Second, they demonstrate the need for further development of the CoR’s unique 
expertise. Third, all scenarios highlight the fundamental impact of the CoR’s 
composition on the CoR’s future role and institutional positioning in the European 
political architecture. Even smaller, well-designed changes in these three 
interrelated domains would have significant impact. 
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Strategic foresight essentially presents a trade-off between short-term and long-
term choices. The choices made today may close the door to other options in the 
long run. In institutional design, these choices constitute critical junctions that 
initiate path dependent processes. In this context, choices may constitute trade-offs. 
For instance, the clear separation of powers at the EU level prescribes that, when 
the CoR integrates with the Parliament, it gradually closes the options for the set-up 
of a European Senate. Depending on these choices, some scenarios are more likely 
than others. The five scenarios lay out these core choices and invite CoR 
policymakers to debate, reflect and shape the CoR’s course over the next decades. 
 
The Scenarios 
 
Scenario 1 – A dynamic status quo 
 
The CoR reinforces its consultative and political powers without a treaty change. 
While not having a formal vote, the CoR reinforces its voice by increasing the 
quality and the impact of its opinions on the legislative process. Improvement of 
form and content of the opinions, early delivery, strong political support and first 
rate expertise on LRA matters underpin the growing standing and prestige of the 
CoR as an advisory body. Moreover, in the area of subsidiarity and proportionality 
the CoR’s impact reporting tools (including their media impact) contribute to 
increasing the value that other EU institutions attach to the CoR’s work. 
 
To achieve the dynamic status quo, the CoR would draft CoR internal guidelines 
and complement the CoR rules of procedure with a so-called ‘Opinion Impact’ 
section. Initiatives that focus on the improvement of the CoR opinions would be 
carried forward. The CoR would also expand and strengthen the introduction and 
training sessions for its members to make up for the relatively high turnover of its 
representatives. Such training courses would also improve the expert capacity of 
the CoR Members, supported by online dynamic aggregate statistics on the 
characteristics of LRAs, bringing direct value added to CoR Members, the LRAs 
and raising the CoR’s expert profile. 
 
The CoR would further strengthen the level of information it provides on how it 
makes decisions. Similar to the EP and the Council, it would publish the details of 
the CoR Commissions’ and Plenary vote. Publishing the voting details underlines 
the support and the distribution of the support among the CoR Members. In 
addition, the publication of the voting details increases good governance practices 
such as transparency, legitimacy and accountability. It would help reconnect CoR 
Members with their constituencies. 
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To further strengthen the ties with all subnational European LRA associations, the 
CoR would draw up a detailed map of their membership and their selection 
procedures. On the basis of the map, the CoR would establish better links with the 
associations of subnational authorities that are in favour of introducing an 
additional criterion on the basis of expertise for designating CoR membership. 
Finally, the CoR would improve its collective co-ordination with clear-cut 
priorities. CoR subcommittees organised on the basis of provenance would 
overcome internal cleavages structures, streamline decision-making and exchange 
information and generate more capacity to speak with one voice. As a result, the 
mandate for CoR Members is likely to become more attractive. However, it should 
be noted that the expression of political preferences from all political groups in the 
CoR would remain an important element. 
 
Scenario 2 – LRA Assembly within the European Parliament 
 
The CoR integrates into the European Parliament following a EU treaty change, 
resulting in the Parliament becoming a bicameral institution with two kinds of 
representation. As an independent sub-chamber of the Parliament, the CoR gives 
voice to the territorial diversity of the LRAs. The CoR would maintain an 
independent plenary based on its distinct membership. Within the European 
Parliament, the CoR acts as a prudent reviser, considering subsidiarity and 
proportionality, and using its expertise in the area of implementing EU legislation 
at the LRA level. 
 
The move towards integration within the European Parliament would be prepared 
by an internal opinion of both the CoR and the EP on the future institutional 
architecture of the EU and would be based on the already close cooperation 
between the CoR and the EP. The opinion would lay out the necessary changes and 
the policy options, and would argue strongly in favour of integrating the CoR as a 
sub-chamber of the EP. The CoR would further strengthen the ties between the 
CoR’s six permanent commissions and their standing Committee counterparts in 
the EP. Most importantly, the CoR would convince standing EP Committees of the 
CoR’s unique expertise and its constructive contribution to their work by offering 
information, issuing timely reports and opinions that could reduce the Committees’ 
workload. In this context, the CoR would be regarded as an even more valuable 
partner in the areas of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
 
In line with the election of MEPs, the CoR would make a case for replacing the 
current designation procedure with an electoral procedure for CoR membership. No 
more than 350 CoR Members would be indirectly elected (on a country by country 
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basis) by the respective associations of subnational authorities that currently select 
the CoR membership. The elections would be brought in line with those of the 
European Parliament. 
 
Scenario 3 – LRA Assembly associated with the Council  
 
The CoR is closely associated with the Council after an EU treaty change. The CoR 
works alongside the Council’s working parties. The CoR Members formally act as 
revisers with expertise in the legislative process, paying close attention to 
subsidiarity and proportionality in the CoR core policy domains for which 
consultation is mandatory. The CoR would maintain an independent plenary on the 
basis of its electoral status and distinct membership. To give the LRA assembly 
more prominence, a total of 200 CoR Members would be indirectly elected next to 
the Council. 
 
To achieve close association with the Council, the CoR would need to explore in 
more detail the necessary institutional changes and the policy options that such 
association would entail. To align itself with and work alongside the Council 
working parties, the CoR would further strengthen the relationship with the Council 
Presidency and reinforce established contacts with the Presidency Trio. 
Particularly, the CoR would offer its expert knowledge in its core policy domains 
to seek synergies with the Presidency Trio’s 18-month programme. The respective 
CoR national delegations play the role of frontrunners for organising informal and 
formal inter-institutional exchanges. Most importantly, the CoR would need to 
convince the Council Presidency and Secretariat of its unique expertise and 
constructive contribution to legislative work by offering information and issuing 
timely reports and opinions that could reduce their workload. 
 
Scenario 4 – The CoR as a territorial platform supporting the work of the 
European Commission 
 
Only a limited EU treaty change would be needed for the CoR to become a 
territorial platform that works closely with the European Commission in the pre-
legislative phase and in the adoption of delegated and implementing acts. The 
Commission Directorate Generals dealing with LRA matters would draw on the 
CoR’s representatives’ expert functions in the areas of subsidiarity, proportionality 
and impact assessments. The CoR would participate as an observer with speaking 
rights followed by the issuance of better informed opinions. As a result, the CoR 
would provide a new avenue for LRAs to participate and strengthen the legitimacy 
of Commission policy making at an early stage. 
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Involvement in the pre-legislative phase and the adoption of delegated and 
implementing acts procedure requires a high level of expertise. The CoR would 
further strengthen this type of expertise on the basis of stronger ties developed with 
all the LRA associations in the Member States. Moreover, the subnational LRA 
associations would introduce an additional criterion for designating CoR 
membership based on expertise. 
 
Most importantly, the CoR would need to convince the Commission of its unique 
expertise and its constructive contribution to the legislative work by issuing timely 
reports and offering information and opinions that could reduce the Commission’s 
workload. 
 
Scenario 5 – A Third Legislative Chamber representing the European LRAs 
 
An extensive EU Treaty revision results in a strong and independent third house – 
the European Senate – with law-making powers on a par with the EP and the 
Council. Within such structure, the European Senate influences EU policy, 
guarantees institutional stability and represents a diversity of European collective 
constituent units that the other two legislative chambers cannot represent. The 
powers of the Senate depend on whether it will stand on an equal footing with or be 
subordinated to the European Parliament and the Council. 
 
Given that the EU would need to reconcile efficient and effective decision-making 
with creating more LRA legitimacy into the EU legislative process, the CoR would 
first need to study and learn from ongoing practices and processes of existing 
Senates in the EU. The findings of such study would reveal interesting practices 
that would inform the manner in which the CoR could become a third legislative 
chamber. The study should lay out the successful territorial practices in Member 
States that would form an illustrative basis for the CoR to move towards a third 
chamber, i.e. the EU Senate. 
 
Subsequently, the CoR would project a higher level of decision-making capacity 
and develop further unique expertise in preparation for a potential convention and 
treaty change. It would make the CoR more credible when arguing in favour of the 
expansion of its legislative powers. In terms of membership, the CoR would 
become a fully elected body. The process leading to the change of the procedure 
should ideally be bottom up. The key players in that process would be the 
subnational LRAs. Therefore, the CoR would need to strengthen its ties with all 
LRA associations. 
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Likelihood and Timing of the Scenarios 
 
Given the initial conditions, the most genuine and linear option is Scenario 1. It is 
the most conceivable scenario in both the short and medium term and should be 
tried first. 
 
While unlikely, scenario 5 is the most coherent alternative to the extent that it has 
the least impact on the internal dynamics of the other EU institutions. Scenario 5 
connects most with the idea of territorial representation in federal states that 
currently exist in the EU. It is a scenario with a long-term horizon, as an EU Senate 
cannot be formed in the short- or medium-term. It results in the most transparent 
strengthening of the CoR as co-legislator on a par with the EP and the Council. 
While such a scenario could be welcomed from a democratic perspective, it would 
require a major revision of the Treaties to streamline the decision-making 
procedures and re-equilibrate the balance of power between the institutions. 
Scenario 4 envisages a narrative of how the Commission could benefit from the 
CoR expertise even knowing that the Commission and other institutions would take 
more note of the CoR's work when realising scenario 1. Scenario 4 has a short- and 
medium-term perspective. 
 
Scenarios 2 and 3 are the least likely of all scenarios. Adding another form of 
sizable representation within or associated with the EP would be more conceivable 
as the institution is set up with a clear representative function. Against this 
background, it is noteworthy that the CoR already co-operates closely with the EP. 
In comparison another form of sizable representation would be less conceivable for 
an LRA Assembly within/associated with the Council. Going beyond the advisory 
functions for the CoR, there is a distinct likelihood that conflicts between the 
Member States and the LRAs would arise, resulting in decision-making 
bottlenecks. Both scenarios 2 and 3 have a medium- to long-term horizon. 
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Likelihood and Timing of the Scenarios 
Scenarios Timing Impact on EU 
institutions  
Ranking 
by 
likelihood 
 Scenario 1: a dynamic 
Status Quo. short term Low 1 
Scenario 2: LRA 
Assembly 
within/associated with the 
European Parliament. 
short to medium 
term High 4 
Scenario 3: LRA 
Assembly 
within/associated with the 
Council. 
medium to long 
term high 5 
Scenario 4: The CoR as a 
Territorial Platform 
supporting the work of 
the European 
Commission. 
medium to long 
term low 3 
Scenario 5: A Third 
Legislative Chamber 
representing the LRAs. long term high 2 
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1 Introduction 
 
In light of the CoR’s 20th anniversary, this report identifies the possible room for 
manoeuvre to optimise the CoR’s legitimacy and the impact of its actions on the 
institutional architecture of the European Union (EU). To this end, the report on the 
CoR’s Future Role and Institutional Positioning is a foresight exercise that 
envisions five possible scenarios with respect to the CoR’s institutional status and 
strategic positioning within the European political scene at the horizon of 2025. 
 
The report is motivated in part by the changes facing the EU over the coming 
months. The institutional and political uncertainty is linked inter alia to the May 
2014 European Parliamentary Elections, the perceived legitimacy crisis in the EU 
and the possibility of a new EU Treaty revision. 
 
The May 2014 European Parliamentary Elections 
 
In May 2014, EU citizens elected a new European Parliament. For the first time, 
the European political parties presented their preferred candidate for the post of 
European Commission (henceforth the Commission) President. The electoral 
choices of EU citizens, therefore, not only determined the composition of the 
Parliament, but they could also influence the designation of the Commission 
President and the composition of the College of EU Commissioners. Moreover, the 
European elections could influence the direction the EU would take and that of its 
policies over the upcoming legislative cycle. The elections could also generate a 
debate about the future of Europe, the post-2015 period, as well as the potential 
revision of the European treaties. 
 
A perceived EU Legitimacy Crisis 
 
The elections take place at a time when EU citizens have grown discontented with 
the functioning of the EU as a political system. A variety of trends in opinion polls 
over the past few years make for uncomfortable reading.
1
 Less people hold a 
positive view about the EU and less than one in three trusts the EU and national 
institutions. 
                                           
1
 EUROBAROMETER (2009) The role and impact of local and regional authorities within the European Union, 
European Commission (Spring 2013) Standard Eurobarometer. s.l. see graph QA22.a.3 (My voice counts in the EU). 
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Undoubtedly, the financial and economic crisis has increased discontent among EU 
citizens, putting pressure on the process of EU integration. Nationalist parties are 
emerging throughout the EU. Growing resentment has resulted in increased 
visibility and presence of these outsider political movements in the 2014 European 
Parliamentary elections, affecting the composition of the new European Parliament 
and possibly the direction EU integration might take over the coming years. In 
short, some trends highlight that for several dimensions of EU integration, broad 
support can no longer be assumed- addressing these concerns is high on the agenda. 
 
Growing calls and complications for EU Treaty revision 
 
The protracted financial and economic crisis has led to more coordinated fiscal 
discipline, economic coordination and policymaking at EU level. Several policy 
initiatives herald a major step forward in the EU integration process: the new EU 
financial, economic and fiscal governance (with the agreement of the European 
Semester); the reformed Stability and Growth Pact; the creation of the 
intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) 
among 25 Member States; the making of the so-called Two Pack and Euro-Plus 
Pact; and the set-up of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
 
These policy responses stretched the EU treaties to their limits and gave rise to 
growing calls for their revision
2
. The clearest indication for the need of a European 
treaty revision can be found in the TSCG of 12 March 2012. 
 
To incorporate the substance of the TSCG into the legal framework of the EU, the 
25 EU signatories (excluding Denmark and the UK) envisage an EU treaty reform 
procedure before 2018.
3
 The degree of such treaty revision remains unclear and 
depends on the extent of substance and institutional revisions. At minimum, one 
could envisage the addition in the TEU or TFEU of a reference to a new protocol 
on the TSCG. Should a complete treaty integration of the TSCG including 
                                           
2
 A. Duff The EU and Federalism: Polities and Policies Compared, in: Laursen (ed.) JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Oxford, UK, 189-190. table 1.3, P. de Schoutheete and S. Micossi (2013) On Political Union in 
Europe: The Changing Landscape of Decision-Making and Political Accountability. Politics and Institutions, CEPS 
Essays, G. Ricard-Nihoul. (June 2007) The revision of the European treaties: the Convention moment: Six arguments 
for its continuation, six proposals for its reform, in: Visions of Europe [Online]. 
3
 (2 March 2012) The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. Brussels. Article 16 of the TSCG stipulates 
that “Within five years, at most, of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the 
experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in accordance with the Treaty on the 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the 
substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union in view of the mandate of the Convention”. 
Introduction 
11 
procedures be executed, Title VIII of Part III of the TFEU (Economic and 
Monetary Policy) and protocols 12, 13 and 14 would have to be reviewed. 
 
To initiate such a procedure, it suffices that one Member State so requests
4
. 
Subsequently, the decision to call a convention in the run up to a treaty revision 
needs to be taken by the European Council after consulting the Commission and the 
EP. Several factors contribute to making the outcome of such Convention 
uncertain. Firstly, recommendations on the reform of the EU treaties require a 
consensus among all parties to the Convention. Secondly, it is the Conference of 
Member States that has the final say. Finally, a ratification procedure takes place in 
all EU Member States. 
 
In this context, some Member States have indicated a preference for limited Treaty 
change. However, there is currently a consensus about the direction. Unless 
unforeseen events occur, the most optimistic calendar for such as a treaty revision 
foresees the calling of a European Convention in 2017-2018, with a new treaty 
taking effect around 2025. 
 
Improving Legitimacy 
 
Questions have been raised about the democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
the strengthening of EU powers in the area of economic, fiscal and financial policy-
making.
5
 National parliaments and the EP do not have a clear oversight of EU 
economic policy-making, while the process of further economic and financial 
integration continues apace towards a ‘genuine economic and monetary union.’6 
The EU is at a crossroads. One option is to limit itself to little or no European treaty 
reform. Alternatively, the EU may strengthen ‘the necessary democratic legitimacy 
and accountability of decision-making within the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), based on the joint exercise of sovereignty for common policies and 
solidarity.’7 While a crucial building block for the future viability the European 
                                           
4
 Article 48 of the TEU. 
5
 Union of European Federalists (2013) Commentary on a fundamental law of the European Union. Brussels, P. de 
Schoutheete and S. Micossi (2013) On Political Union in Europe: The Changing Landscape of Decision-Making and 
Political Accountability. Politics and Institutions, CEPS Essays, The Spinelli Group and Bertelsmann Stiftung 
(2013) A Fundamental Law of the European Union, Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
6
 European Commission (30/11/2012) Communication From the Commission: A blueprint for a deep and genuine 
economic and monetary union: Launching a European Debate. Brussels. Herman Van Rompuy, José Manuel 
Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker and Mario Draghi (5 December 2012,) Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union. Brussels. 
7
 President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy (26 June 2012) Towards a Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union. Brussels. 
Introduction 
12 
project, the strengthening of EU powers in the area of economic, fiscal and 
financial policy-making challenges the existing EU institutional balance between 
EU institutions, the Member States, the Local and Regional Authorities (LRAs) and 
their citizens. 
 
The process is further complicated by calls in the Member States for repatriation of 
EU competences (see the so-called Balance of Competences Review (UK) and 
wish list (the Netherlands) and the possible UK referendum in 2017 on the terms of 
EU membership). 
 
The CoR's contribution to the democratic life of the EU 
 
The current situation in the EU also concerns the CoR as an institutional actor in 
the EU decision-making process. The uncertainty directly affects the CoR as a 
representative body of LRAs and its contribution to the democratic character of the 
EU. The CoR is all the more affected when the functional boundaries for social and 
economic policy in the EU, such as economic, labour market and welfare policies, 
are blurred across national, regional and local levels, with regions and cities taking 
on more responsibility in less unitary Member States.
8
 Therefore, the objective of 
enhancing the adequate role and representation of European LRAs will continue to 
define the agenda of the CoR in the decades to come. What implications might a 
changing EU have for the CoR? Which changes might the CoR have to make to its 
day-to-day functioning, its formal status and its relations with institutional partners 
and territorial stakeholders? 
 
In answering these questions, this report presents five scenarios informed by 
academic and other types of analyses on the institutional status and activities of the 
CoR.
9
 The first scenario centres on ‘a dynamic status quo,’ reinforcing the CoR’s 
consultative and political powers without treaty change. The second scenario 
depicts an LRA Assembly associated with the EP. In the third scenario, the CoR is 
pictured as an LRA Assembly associated with the Council of the European Union 
                                           
8
 M. Keating (2013) Rescaling the European State, The Making of Territory and the Rise of the Meso, Oxford: 
Oxford: Oxford university press, 2013. 
9
 D. Panke and C. Hönnige (2013) The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social 
Committee: How Influential are Consultative Committees in the European Union?, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 51, 452-471, J. Loughlin (2007) Reconfiguring the State: Trends in Territorial Governance in European 
States, Regional & Federal Studies, 17, 385-403, J. Loughlin (1997) Representing Regions in Europe: The 
Committee of the Regions in: Jeffery (ed.) The regional dimension of the European Union : towards a third level in 
Europe?, London: Frank Cass, M. Brunazzo and E. Domorenok (2008) New Members in Old Institutions: The 
Impact of Enlargement on the Committee of the Regions, Regional & Federal Studies, 18, 429-448. 
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(the Council). In the fourth scenario, the CoR is represented as a territorial platform 
supporting the Commission. Finally, the fifth scenario centres on the CoR as a third 
legislative chamber representing the European LRAs and acting as a Senate next to 
the EP and Council. 
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2 Scenarios 
 
For each of the five scenarios, the relative impact is assessed with regard to: (a) the 
institutional set up; (b) the decision-making procedures; (c) the inter-institutional 
relations; and, (d) the CoR member status. 
 
Across these variables, the five scenarios systematically analyse a number of 
transversal issues such as: (a) the need for possible Treaty reforms (the revision of 
new tasks to existing or new players, the emergence of new institutions and 
bodies); (b) the impact on the CoR and its prerogatives (the CoR’s role in the 
legislative process); (c) the impact on other institutions (its impact on the checks 
and balances among, and institutional prerogatives of, the Council, Commission, 
EP and national parliaments); and, (d) the coexistence of several parallel political 
and socio-economic dynamics in Europe. 
 
The combination of the four vertical variables with four cross-sectional variables 
allows for 16 observations for each individual scenario. These permutations should 
allow the scenarios to answer the following questions: 
 
 How can the CoR further legitimise the EU and contribute to the democratic 
character of the EU? 
 How can LRA representatives be involved at EU level? 
 Should the CoR’s competences be expanded so as to include the CoR in the 
inter-institutional balance? 
 What role can the CoR play at the EU level and how can it differentiate itself 
from the other EU institutions? 
 How can the CoR increase its visibility both at the European and 
national/local level? 
 How can CoR membership provide more value added to its members? 
 
The five scenarios provide some indications for an answer to these questions in 
view of the CoR’s future role and institutional positioning. At this stage, it is 
important to note that all scenarios implicitly assume respect for the Community 
method. This assumption is based on recent comprehensive analysis of the 
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evolution of the Community method and its centrality to the functioning of the EU 
today and tomorrow.
10
 
                                           
10
 Y. Bertoncini and V. Kreilinger (February 2012) Seminar on the Community Method: Elements of Synthesis. 
Brussels. 
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2.1 Scenario 1: a dynamic Status Quo  
 
This first scenario assumes that, despite having access to decision-making arenas in 
the EU, the CoR will still lack formal voting power (‘voice without a vote’). Its 
contribution to the democratic character of the EU has maximised its competences 
without changing the EU Treaty, thanks to strengthening the influence of CoR 
opinions. Such reinforcement rests upon the improvement of the form and content 
of the opinions and the unique information and expertise they offer to the EU 
institutions. 
 
Also, the CoR’s functioning and its relations with other EU institutions can become 
more effective and efficient without changing the EU treaties. Under such a 
scenario, the CoR's consultative and political powers are reinforced with respect to 
policies with greater territorial impact, namely cohesion policy; economic and 
social policy; education, youth, culture and research policy; environment, climate 
change and energy policy; citizenship policy; and natural resources policy. The 
reinforcement occurs primarily through gains in efficiency and effectiveness, close 
cooperation with EU institutions and improved decision-making. Membership of 
the CoR would be adjusted either through Member States designating specific 
profiles to CoR positions per policy role, or by adding an additional criteria for 
selecting candidates at the level of associations of subnational authorities. 
 
2.1.1 Institutional Set-Up 
 
The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the role of the CoR as an advisory body within the 
institutional structure of the EU. It furthermore granted the CoR direct access to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ‘for the purpose of protecting [its] prerogatives’11 
or on grounds of infringement of the subsidiarity principle. 
12
 Moreover, the CoR 
plays a role in the inter-institutional balance of the EU and enhances the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy by expressing the opinions of subnational authorities and 
guaranteeing that decisions are taken at the level closest to EU citizens. 
 
2.1.2 Decision-making procedures 
 
The CoR can formally influence the legislative procedure in three distinct ways. 
First, the Commission, the EP and the Council must consult the CoR in those 
                                           
11
 Art. 263(3) TFEU. 
12
 Protocol (No 2) on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Art.8. 
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policy areas explicitly mentioned in the Treaties. Second, in all other cases (in 
particular those which concern cross-border cooperation
13
) in which the 
Commission, EP and the Council consider it appropriate, so-called ‘optional or 
facultative opinions’ may be requested.14 Last, the CoR 'may issue an opinion on its 
own initiative in cases in which it considers such action appropriate.'
15
 It has the 
possibility, furthermore, to bring actions before the ECJ.
16
  
 
Despite the fact that the opinions of the CoR in the consultation procedure are not 
binding on EU institutions, they carry some legal weight, particularly in the area of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. The opinions present a procedural requirement in 
cases of compulsory jurisdiction.
17
 In addition to the current practice, the CoR 
should encourage the EP and the Council to establish the practice of referring to the 
opinions in the preamble of the legal act and to explain whether and how the CoR 
opinions were taken into consideration.
 18
 While the EP and the Council formally 
refer to the CoR opinions, the Commission Secretariat reports periodically on the 
CoR opinions, explaining whether and how they have been taken into 
consideration. 
 
Improvement of CoR Opinions 
 
The ability of the CoR to shape the content of a position or a policy outcome to 
match its own opinions has improved. Increasing the CoR's political impact means 
increasing the influence of LRAs in the EU.
19
 To this end, the CoR has established 
several impact reporting tools that measure the follow-up in the legislative 
processes of the Commission, EP and Council, including their media impact. A 
number of independent studies evaluated the CoR’s impact on the legislative 
                                           
13
 In all market creating and market correcting policies, the CoR is obliged to provide advice to the Council and the 
EP before the first reading of the policy proposal. These include policy areas such as internal market, environment, 
sustainable development, agriculture, employment, social policy, cohesion policy, youth and education, vocational 
training, research and innovation, culture, health, transport and energy, consumer policy and trade.   
14
 The consultative role of the CoR is dealt with in Article 13(4) TEU, and Art 307 TFEU. See specifically Article 
307 (1) TFEU. 
15
 Article 307 (4) TFEU. More broadly the consultative role of the CoR is dealt with in Article 13(4) TEU, and Art 
307 TFEU.   
16
 Article 263 (3) TFEU and Article 8 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality.  
17
 K. Lenaerts and N. Cambien (2010) Regions and the European Courts: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of 
Member States, European Law Review, 35, 609-635. 
18
 Article 296 (2) TFEU. 
19
 D. Panke and C. Hönnige (2013) The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social 
Committee: How Influential are Consultative Committees in the European Union?, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 51, 452-471.-456, M. I. Neshkova (2010) The impact of subnational interests on supranational regulation, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 1193-1211. 
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process and came to the conclusion that the CoR is able to influence 25% to 60% of 
the (depending on the accounting method) Commission’s legislative decisions.20 
Particularly on regional matters, the Commission appears to value the expertise of 
the CoR, a fact reflected by the higher rate of CoR proposals being taken up. The 
analyses further demonstrate that the Commission is more likely to listen to 
decentralised interest when the public has become dissatisfied with the EU's 
democratic process. The influence also grows if the CoR opinions are delivered in a 
timely fashion via the formal decision-making process. When opinions are taken 
into account, their influence enhances cooperation with the Commission and 
EP and reinforces the CoR's place in the legislative process. 
 
Improving the content and delivery of the CoR opinions will undoubtedly allow the 
CoR to more significantly contribute to the EU legislative process. To improve 
CoR opinions, some changes can be made to their form, delivery and content. 
The more concise the opinion, the easier it is for the EU institutions to take them 
into account or request additional information. Moreover, the CoR opinions should 
be delivered early in the policy process in a more uniform and easy to digest 
language, both towards the Members and other EU institutions. Most importantly, 
the opinions should provide unique information and policy tools, and set out 
clear amendments to improve legislative proposals. 
 
Expertise and the CoR Opinions 
 
Crucially, improving the weight of the CoR opinions in the EU legislative process 
depends on the quality and uniqueness of the information in the opinions it 
provides. This information comes in part from other EU institutions with respect to 
the anticipated EU policy programme and the progress of the policy agenda. 
However, the most important ingredient in the CoR opinions is the CoR’ s unique 
expertise, which stems from up-to-date data and analysis coming from a network 
of members (out of a total of over 90.000 LRAs throughout the EU). The CoR 
draws on the 146 partners of the ‘CoR Subsidiarity Monitoring Network,’ the 
members of the ‘Europe 2020 Monitoring Platform,’ and those that are part of the 
‘Register of European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation.’21 The CoR should 
                                           
20
 D. Panke and C. Hönnige (2013) The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social 
Committee: How Influential are Consultative Committees in the European Union?, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 51, 452-471, W. E. Carroll (2011) The Committee of the Regions: A Functional Analysis of the CoR's 
Institutional Capacity, Regional & Federal Studies, 21, 341-354, M. I. Neshkova (2010) The impact of subnational 
interests on supranational regulation, Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 1193-1211. 
21
Committee of the Regions (2014) Europe 2020 Monitoring Platform. 
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insist on this unique expertise based on its representative legitimacy of all the 
subnational interests. The CoR should strive to base such expertise on a rich and 
constant feed of quantitative and qualitative data that back up the arguments 
and views in the CoR’s opinions. In this respect, the CoR opinions may have an 
indirect influence on the policy priorities of EU institutions. The influence will rest 
on items for which the CoR has developed a strong and unique expertise, where 
only the CoR can provide sound opinions on the basis of bottom-up policy and 
input processes. 
 
The CoR has a variety of options it can explore to improve its expert functions. 
One is the development of a European LRAs' knowledge hub and LRA network, 
which gathers information from the LRAs in a number of clearly defined policy 
areas. This could take the form of an online portal. The CoR could launch common 
guidelines, indicators, benchmarking and the sharing of best practices on the basis 
of its network. It could also hold competitions among LRAs in the different policy 
areas with awards and grants offered in cooperation with the Commission for the 
boldest and most practical ideas to improve the lives of citizens in LRAs. 
 
The CoR and Citizens’ Initiatives 
 
The CoR has the possibility to indirectly access the legislative and subsequent 
policy processes by supporting European Citizens Initiatives (ECI). The ECI is a 
quasi-legislative, pre-initiative that can reduce the distance between the EU and EU 
citizens
22
. However, the institutional hurdles for an ECI to succeed are 
considerable. While the CoR's neutrality limits its role, it can contribute as 
communicator and facilitator for issues that are close to its mandate and supported 
by a majority of the CoR Members. Such a role for the CoR would not only 
legitimise the institution, but the CoR would also gain privileged access to 
information and legislative proposals in an embryonic phase, allowing it to develop 
expertise necessary for formulating its opinions. 
  
                                                                                                                                        
http://portal.cor.europa.eu/europe2020/Knowledge/Pages/CurrentMembers.aspx; See also the List of Partners of the 
CoR Subsidiarity Monitoring Network: Parliaments or assemblies representing regions with legislative powers (10 
June 2013), avalaiable at  
https://portal.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/Documents/SMN%20-%20List%20of%20Network%20Partners/SMN%20-
%20List%20of%20Network%20Partners%20-%20EN%20-%2010%20Jun%202013_MASTER%20LIST.pdf. 
22
 The legal basis of the citizens' initiative is set out in Article 11(4) TEU and Article 24(1) TFEU.European 
Parliament and European Council (16 Februari 2011) Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 on the Citizens’ Initiative. 
L65/1, 11/03/2001. 
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2.1.3 Inter-institutional Relations 
 
The CoR’s role at the EU level in the inter-institutional balance and cooperation 
with the EU institutions such as the EP, the Council and the Commission is 
essential in fulfilling its mandate. Through cooperation across all stages of the EU 
decision-making, LRAs participate in the definition of EU policies and thereby 
define the CoR’s role in the system of re-equilibration and re-positioning 
competences of the EU institutional framework. At the most basic level, these 
checks and balances centre on the separation of powers and the distribution of 
competences in the EU.
23
 Cooperation with EU institutions is based on formal 
agreements, sharing of information, and where applicable, assets. 
 
Cooperation with the EP 
 
 Formal 
 
On 5 February 2014, the CoR and the EP signed a new cooperation 
agreement, strengthening their political relationship on the basis of 
‘anticipation, coordination and optimisation.’ 24  The agreement creates 
synergies between administrative resources. CoR Members will be able to 
use translation, research and documentation services of the new Parliament 
Research Service (DG EPRS). 
 
The agreement also creates a structured dialogue that allows the CoR's 
members to participate in the EP's legislative activities. It creates a new, 
intensified cooperation procedure that offers an opportunity for CoR 
rapporteurs to directly contribute and influence the outcome of the legislative 
procedure by participating in discussions in the EP. As a result, cooperation 
will be reinforced upstream- by own-initiative opinions, amongst others- and 
downstream- by territorial assessments of the impact of European legislation. 
Such developments could happen full scale in the distant future. While the 
new cooperation brings CoR and EP closer, a joint inter-institutional meeting 
between CoR and EP at the level of the plenary or that of the CoR 
Commissions and EP Committees would enhance synergies between the two 
institutions further. 
 
                                           
23
According to interpretation of Art 13 of the TEU.  
24
 Cooperation Agreement Between the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels 
(05/02/2014). 
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 Information-sharing 
 
The CoR and the EP exchange information through their respective 
directorates. The information sharing is sideways and top-down, 
predominantly concerning the CoR’s and EP’s procedural functions and 
political dynamics in the legislative process, but also on such issues as 
impact assessments and communication. Improvements relate to ensuring 
timely delivery of opinions on the work of the EP (e.g. working programme 
EP), with positive effect on the political debate in the committees and the 
plenary. To maximise the effect, opinions should be formulated in such a 
way that they are concise and carry amendments for improvement. This 
would encourage the practice of including CoR opinions in EP meeting 
documents. 
 
The CoR opinion take-up would benefit from advances in the development 
of the CoR's expert function. Such expertise would also increase the CoR’s 
visibility provided it could be mobilised at short notice. It would enhance the 
standing of the CoR as the voice of LRAs. This type of expertise results from 
information and analyses based on a bottom-up approach and informed by 
survey data and information that comes from a network of partners of the 
‘CoR Subsidiarity Monitoring Network,’ the members of the ‘Europe 2020 
Monitoring Platform,’ and those that are part of the ‘Register of European 
Groupings of Territorial Cooperation’. The topics of importance (les 
domaines d’excellence) include territorial cohesion, urban policy, macro 
regions and impact assessments because of their direct relevance to LRAs. 
The topics would also involve issues related to governance mechanisms such 
as territorial and subsidiarity analyses and multilevel governance. 
 
 The CoR’s assets: Political Groups, the Committee work and the Plenary 
 
The political groups tie the EP and CoR together. Any reinforcement of the 
political groups in the CoR and the EP via political group meetings, contacts 
between presidents and the bureau, parliamentary invitations to outside 
meetings of the CoR, conferences and seminars organised by the CoR, and 
contacts between committee rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs are 
beneficial to the legislative work and the influence of the CoR. Particularly 
important are the close political and institutional contacts between CoR’s six 
permanent commissions. These are: (1) Territorial Cohesion Policy 
(COTER); (2) Economic and Social Policy (ECOS); (3) Education, Youth, 
Culture and Research (EDUC); (4) Environment, Climate Change and 
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Energy (ENVE); (5) Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External 
Affairs (CIVEX); and, (6) Natural Resources (NAT) and their respective 
counterparts in the EP. The COTER and the EP Commission on Regional 
Policy (REGI) have a joint session during the Open Days. 
 
There is room for improvement to contribute to an early delivery of CoR 
opinions. In particular, this could be achieved through the reinforcement of: 
(a) cooperation in the preparatory phase of the working programme and 
coordination of activities; (b) contacts between the rapporteurs and the 
administrators of the two institutions early in the legislative procedure; and, 
(c) close contacts in the run-up to trilogues. Finally, the CoR’s visibility and 
that of its opinions benefits from increasing the presence of the CoR 
Members in EP committees' meetings. This is also the case for EP 
rapporteurs participating in CoR Commissions' meetings and Plenary 
Sessions. 
 
Cooperation with Council 
 
 Formal 
 
The CoR and the Council have not established a formal cooperation 
agreement. Despite the fact that the CoR monitors and verifies the 
subsidiarity principle in EU draft legislation, the CoR has little access to the 
Council proceedings in the legislative phase. 
 
There is a need for the CoR to develop formal capabilities vis-à-vis the 
Council throughout the legislative process. It would allow the CoR to 
identify and signal to the Council those parts in its position that it deems to 
infringe the subsidiarity and proportionality principle. Moreover, in a similar 
vein to agreements with the EP and Commission, the CoR would be able to 
formally structure the dialogue and follow-up with the Council. So far, the 
Council-CoR dialogue has been rather ad-hoc (e.g. participation in informal 
ministerial meetings). The CoR could improve its relations with the Council 
particularly in those areas where the CoR is required to provide its opinion, 
as well as in those areas that are the domaines d’excellence of the CoR, such 
as territorial cohesion, urban policy and macro-regions- these are directly 
related to the CoR’s Political Priorities 2012-2015. In partnership with 
LRAs, these priorities focus on the achievement of “Europe 2020” as part of 
the EU’s roadmap for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, with better 
investment roles for local and regional authorities (LRAs) in the Single 
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Market. Also, the territorial dimension of EU external relations is an 
important priority.
25
 
 
These domaines d’excellence and political priorities also involve issues 
related to governance mechanisms, such as territorial and subsidiarity 
analyses of the Council work and multilevel governance. A formal 
cooperation agreement would also guarantee an improved and continuous 
flow of information about the legislative process in the Council. Such an 
agreement could envisage sharing information amongst others concerning 
the meeting schedule, the agendas and the work in the Council. It would 
allow the CoR to adjust and synchronise (when possible) its own work. 
 
 Information sharing 
 
The CoR established informal working relations with the Council Presidency 
and Secretariat. A formalisation of such cooperation would greatly enhance 
the CoR's visibility, as well as its influence on the EU legislative process in 
terms of access to information, anticipation of the legislative agenda and the 
timely delivery of opinions to the Council. 
One area of particular importance to the CoR is the Presidency Trio, i.e. the 
three successive Council Presidencies that combine their respective priorities 
into an 18-month policy programme. The CoR could reinforce the 
relationship with the Presidency Trio via the General Secretariat's 
Directorate for Inter-institutional Relations and the relevant national 
delegations to the CoR, and propose initiatives to be included in the Trio 
Presidency programme
26
. 
 
Additional reinforcement of the information flow could be achieved in the 
following areas: 
 
o Opinion: Concise, timely and uniform CoR opinions help Presidencies 
and generate visibility. Presidencies often have limited resources and a 
short time frame to leave their mark on the EU legislative process. 
                                           
25
 Committee of the Regions (2013) Political Priorities 2012 - 2015, available at 
http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/brochures/Documents/political-priorities-2012-2015/political-priorities-
en.pdf. 
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 Committee of the Regions (2010) Follow-up to the Lisbon Treaty. Drafted by European Institute of Public 
Administration (Maastricht and Barcelona). 
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Most importantly, the opinions should provide policy tools, 
information and amendments on how legislation can be improved. 
o Domaines d’Excellence: bring the rapporteurs of the CoR in contact 
with the Presidency on key files and associate the Presidency with key 
dossiers in the CoR. The CoR may also want to systematically invite 
the Presidency to the CoR commissions' meetings and to plenary 
sessions. 
o Territorial know-how: Provide the Council with an improved 
territorial impact analysis  
o Budgetary issues: the CoR may organise one major conference in the 
budgetary cycle with the EU Presidency, the EP, the national 
governments and the LRAs to discuss budgetary issues. 
 
 National Delegations 
 
The national delegations bind the Council and the CoR together. Given their 
proximity, the CoR national delegations’- particularly the chair and co-
ordinator- and the Permanent Representatives of the Council would benefit 
from regular contacts. A practical improvement would be to reinforce the 
cooperation between the CoR and those ministers in the Council that are 
also ministers in their respective regions.
27
 With their double-hatted 
function as both representatives of regions and national delegations members 
in the Council, they are ideally placed to have both a regional and Council 
view on EU legislative activity. Regardless of whether they are CoR 
Members, given their institutional position at the regional and the EU level, 
they are likely to be interested in the CoR’s mission. Therefore, the CoR 
could organise a yearly event (conference, workshop or seminar) to exchange 
views and information on CoR-Council relations and co-operation. The 
representatives of the three successive Presidencies (the Presidency Trio) 
could also be invited. 
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standpunten voor de Intergouvernmentele Conferentie 2004. s.l. 
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Cooperation with the Commission 
 
 Formal 
 
The CoR and the Commission have a longer established formal cooperation 
based on the Protocol on Cooperation between the Commission and the 
Committee of the Regions, with the latest protocol agreed in February 
2012.
28
 The protocol strengthens the relationship between the CoR and the 
Commission and improves the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's 
Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
29
 The protocol leaves plenty of room for further 
improvement for information sharing and the CoR expert function. 
 
 Information Sharing 
 
As the Protocol on Cooperation demonstrates, the CoR and the Commission 
have an intense collaboration requiring a systematic and exhaustive exchange 
of information in the pre-legislative and legislative phase. The exchange of 
information concerns the CoR’s and Commission's functions in the 
legislative process. In the pre-legislative phase, the CoR and the 
Commission's interaction relates particularly to the Commission's work 
programme for the forthcoming year, the medium-term Commission 
initiatives and the consultative procedure of the CoR. In the legislative phase, 
the CoR and Commission interact on the consultation procedure, the re-
consultation and the developments in negotiations between the co-legislators 
and the subsidiarity monitoring. 
 
Such information exchanges concern the CoR's information and 
Commission’s procedural functions in the (pre-) legislative process. The 
Protocol on Cooperation envisages interactions that comprise a number of 
elements necessary for the reinforced cooperation to work well. They are: (a) 
a complete and timely (early) exchange of information on the annual work 
programme and medium-term initiatives of the Commission; (b) the close 
                                           
28
 Protocol on Cooperation between the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels (16 
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29
 Committee of the Regions (2010) Follow-up to the Lisbon Treaty. Drafted by European Institute of Public 
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cooperation and interaction with the Secretary General of the Commission on 
the list of upcoming proposals for consultation; and, (c) the involvement of 
CoR expertise in the area of impact assessment, subsidiarity monitoring and 
expert participation, possibly through observer status. 
 
Strengthening mandatory opinions involves ensuring timely delivery of 
opinions against the work of the Commission. The opinions should be 
formulated in such a manner that they are concise and carry amendments for 
improvement. The opinions would also generate more impact if uniform and 
backed up by larger majorities in the CoR. 
 
Expertise and Opinions 
 
Developing the CoR’s expert function would, in turn, increase the impact of the 
CoR’s opinions. Furthermore, the CoR may reinforce the impact of its opinions on 
the Commission provided the opinions enjoy broad support within the CoR. 
Finally, concise, high-quality opinions with clear recommendations and 
amendments delivered in a timely manner are likely to boost the CoR’s impact on 
the legislative process. 
 
2.1.4 CoR Member Status 
 
The CoR membership represents the cornerstone of its representative legitimacy 
and its role in the democratic life of the EU. In 2014, the CoR had 353 members 
from the 28 EU Member States. The members are appointed for a five-year term. 
They hold a political mandate at the regional or local level, or they have to be 
accountable to an elected assembly.
30
 As a result, CoR membership is varied and 
characterised by the different legislative and administrative competences of the 
LRA that they originate from. Some of these LRAs have extensive legislative 
competences in their respective Member State while others carry out more 
administrative functions within their jurisdiction. In the CoR the Members are 
organised in 28 national delegations crossing five political groupings (EPP, PES, 
ALDE, EA and ECR). The CoR Members are not based in Brussels, a feature that 
allows them to be in closer contact with their respective LRAs throughout the EU. 
These characteristics allow the CoR to have the finger on the pulse of EU 
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LRAs and bestow the assembly with large input legitimacy and a truly 
representative function. 
 
However, the set-up of the CoR membership has three main drawbacks. First, the 
CoR Members are appointed by the Council and as a result the Member States 
control their appointment. Second, the heterogeneity of the CoR membership often 
results in an output legitimacy gap with policies at times representing the lowest 
common denominator. In the past, the diversity of the CoR’s membership has often 
resulted in internal cleavages, which limited the CoR's capacity to speak with one 
voice.
31
 Finally, the members are not permanently present in Brussels and have to 
make do with more limited resources, compared to the EP and the Commission. 
 
How can the CoR address these shortcomings without an EU treaty change? First, 
CoR membership can be influenced through policy platforms at the subnational 
level. Usually, the Council and Member States respect the subnational selection 
procedure. For each national delegation the respective associations of regional and 
local authorities play a key role in the selection procedure. They draw up a list of 
candidates on the basis of political party association/representation, gender and 
territorial balance that is subsequently submitted to the national government for 
final decision. The national governments accept the list of candidates and usually 
approve it before forwarding it to the Council. The Council then officially appoints 
the members.
32
 
 
Additional selection criteria for making up the candidacy list can be added on the 
basis of matching LRA and CoR policy and political priorities. This would allow 
the candidate list to also include a selection on the basis of expertise on the more 
pressing policy issues that can be brought to the fore in the CoR assembly. In 
practice this can be achieved through improving the ties between the CoR and the 
associations of LRAs in the Member States. The CoR as representative of the 
territorial component at the EU level would be well placed to communicate the 
European agenda to the local level and bring up policy issues of relevance for 
LRAs at the EU level, thereby making use of its extensive LRA network 
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throughout the EU. For instance, as an EU body with an inter-institutional 
agreement with the Commission, it is well informed about the annual work 
programmes, which it can easily communicate to the LRAs and their associations 
of subnational authorities (a top-down approach). Moreover, on the basis of its 
extensive network and information coming from the associations of subnational 
authorities, the CoR can inform itself and receive input about LRA related policy 
issues. In this sense, the LRA network, the associations of subnational authorities 
and the CoR Members, represent the link between local and regional levels on the 
one hand, and the EU level of governance on the other hand. As a result of linking 
the different levels of EU government, the CoR would also gain visibility at the 
level of the associations of subnational authorities. 
 
Second, CoR membership can be strengthened by adjusting the CoR’s rules of 
procedure while reinforcing the link between the CoR membership and the output 
of the CoR’s work in the EU’s institutional set up.33 For example, the CoR could 
organise its membership on the basis of their provenance (regions, cities and 
localities) and introduce a set of criteria, such as competences or population 
requirements. The CoR could group its membership in working groups on the basis 
of LRAs with similar population size and competences. These working groups of 
localities, cities and regions would allow for better information exchange and co-
ordination within and between these working groups. Given that policy issues 
among regions, cities and localities are more similar, such working groups would 
also allow for swifter and more effective action that EU decision-making requires. 
They would also produce more uniform opinions according to the level of LRAs, as 
internal cleavages based on competences and level of subnational interest are 
reduced. It would also make the mandate of CoR membership more valuable and 
attractive to the members, as the information exchange and work of the CoR would 
rise and have more value and likely impact the visibility for its members. 
 
Third, the non-permanent presence in Brussels of CoR Members, coupled with 
limited resources, affects the representation and visibility of LRA issues at the EU 
level. For example, the dissemination of the CoR political priorities and work: the 
Commission policy priorities and efforts that have a distinct impact on LRAs can 
be addressed via a number of ICT and environmentally responsible solutions. 
Today, ICT platforms, video conferencing and social media allow for LRA 
representatives to organise themselves better at lower costs compared to the past. 
Such platforms could also be used by CoR Members and bridge the high turnover 
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of CoR representatives. There are examples of bottom-up coordination between 
LRAs on specific issues such as the Covenant of Mayors.
34
 The role of the CoR 
administration as coordinator is crucial in this respect. 
 
2.1.5 Recommendations 
 
Against the background of reconciling efficient and effective decision-making with 
injecting more LRA legitimacy in the EU law and policy making, the ‘Dynamic 
Status Quo’ Scenario makes the following recommendations: 
 
 Opinion impact: 
 
1. Draft CoR internal guidelines and complement the CoR rules of 
procedure with a so-called ‘Opinion Impact’ section. Elements such as 
‘short, concise, large majority, clear recommendations in the form of 
amendments and regulatory proposals, and early delivery’, on which 
the CoR has already taken initiatives, should be the main focus of the 
‘Opinion Impact’ guidelines and additional rules of procedure. When 
properly applied in the preparatory and drafting stages, these concepts 
would increase the impact of CoR opinions. In view of the comparably 
high membership turnover, the guidelines and supplemental rules would 
form the basis for an introduction or training sessions for new CoR 
Members to bring them up to speed with effective European policy 
making. Such introductory courses are present in the CoR and political 
groups also take part. However, the CoR could strengthen this element 
particularly against the background of the high turnover of CoR 
representatives. 
 
2. Develop and project a high level of unique expertise through 
quantification of CoR qualitative information that can be rapidly 
mobilised in support of CoR opinions. Currently the CoR has a website 
hosting a significant number of documents. However, online dynamic 
aggregate statistics on the number of LRAs, their characteristics, the 
number of opinions by policy domain, their acceptance rates, are not 
present and impact assessments are not yet available. They are not 
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 One example is the so-called ‘Covenant of Mayors’, which is the mainstream European movement involving local 
and regional authorities, voluntarily committing to increasing energy efficiency and use of renewable energy sources  
in their territories. Another example is the ‘Mayors Challenge’ under a platform on the competition for bold ideas 
from city leaders.   
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available elsewhere either. Having such a tool at the fingertips would 
bring added value to CoR Members and the LRAs and raise the CoR’s 
profile as an expert. The CoR should prioritise the use of infographics and 
more compelling types of presentation. Informal influence on legislative 
processes is associated with expertise and its quality reflected in 
proposals. 
 
 Decision-making: 
 
1. Publish the details of the Commission and Plenary vote within the CoR 
opinions (name, political party, vote). While the CoR opinions have been 
standardised, publishing the voting details as practiced in the EP and 
Council, particularly when large majorities prevail, commands more political 
clout. It underlines the support of the opinion and the distribution of the 
support, opposition and considerations among the CoR Members. In 
addition, the publication increases EU good governance practices such as 
transparency, legitimacy and accountability. It would also reconnect CoR 
Members with their LRA constituency and subnational association and make 
CoR Members more accountable to the greatest extent possible, within their 
constituency. 
 
2. Map the other institutions’ political position on a legislative proposal. In 
case of conflict facilitate the policy position of the EU institutions by 
providing support to the EU institutions’ position. The mapping of 
political positions could be carried out on a case by case basis by the CoR 
services and graphically represented in an information note, as has been done 
in more academic studies.
35
 The CoR Members could, on the basis of such 
representation, take a strategic political position vis-à-vis those EU 
institutions that are closer to the views of the CoR, in order to obtain the best 
legislative results for the LRAs. The CoR’s position to be expressed in the 
opinions is likely to be accepted more often to the extent that it seeks to 
resolve conflicts between the Commission, the EP and the Council. Such 
strategy allows other EU institutions to align their position with that of the 
CoR and justify policies and argumentation on the basis of additional support 
coming from the CoR and the LRAs. Such strategy would raise the influence 
of the CoR on the eventual policy outcome. 
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 R. Thomson (2011) Resolving controversy in the European Union : legislative decision-making before and after 
enlargement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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 Membership: 
 
1. Develop expertise: Strengthen the ties with all subnational European 
LRA associations and draw up a detailed map of their membership and 
their electoral/appointment procedures. Subsequently, lobby the 
associations of subnational authorities in favour of introducing an 
additional criterion on the basis of expertise for designating CoR 
membership. Lay out the reasons why adding such criterion would be 
beneficial for LRAs and the associations and how they would benefit 
(rising input in the European legislative process, addressing LRA 
concerns at an early stage, growing visibility on a European stage). 
 
2. More Common Collective coordination with clear-cut priorities: 
Create CoR subcommittees organised on the basis of provenance to 
overcome internal cleavages, streamline decision-making and exchange 
information and generate capacity to speak with a single voice. As a 
result, the mandate for CoR Members is likely to become more attractive. 
However, it should be noted that the support of all political groups would 
be an important element. 
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2.1.6 Synoptic Table 
 
Scenario No. 1: A Dynamic Status Quo 
 TEU Changes 
(if needed) 
Impact on the CoR and 
its prerogatives 
Impact on other EU institutions 
Overall  
institutional  
setup  
(as defined  
by the  
Treaties) 
No: the CoR will 
increase the 
effectiveness, 
efficiency and 
impact of its 
functioning 
within the 
boundaries of the 
EU Treaty, Art. 
295 TFEU. 
consultation: quality of 
opinions and expert 
function greatly 
enhanced. 
subsidiarity: quality and 
expert function greatly 
enhanced. 
 
facilitator 
Commission: follow-up of inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
EP: follow-up of inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
Council: establishment of inter-
institutional agreement. 
Decision- 
making  
procedures 
No: the CoR will 
increase the 
effectiveness, 
efficiency and 
impact of its 
functioning 
within the 
boundaries of the 
EU Treaty. 
consultation: issuance of 
more timely, concise 
opinions with clear 
amendments. 
subsidiarity: CoR 
monitoring capacity ex 
ante and ex post is 
significantly enhanced. 
citizens initiatives: CoR 
becomes an informal 
platform and 
facilitator   
Commission: better cooperation 
with Commission and more 
influence of CoR opinions on 
legislative proposals.  
 
EP: better cooperation with EP 
and more influence of CoR 
opinions on legislative decisions. 
 
Council: better cooperation with 
Council and more influence of 
CoR opinions on legislative 
decisions. 
Inter- 
institutional 
relations  
and  
existing  
checks  
and  
balances 
No: the CoR will 
increase the 
effectiveness, 
efficiency and 
impact of its 
functioning 
within the 
boundaries of the 
EU Treaty. 
consultation: CoR 
influence on EU 
legislative work grows 
significantly based on 
a/the bottom-up 
approach. 
 
subsidiarity: CoR 
influence on territorial 
impact of EU legislative 
work grows significantly. 
 
Commission: CoR opinions and 
ex-ante subsidiarity checks have 
higher impact on Commission 
proposals.  
 
EP: CoR opinions and ex-post 
subsidiarity checks have higher 
impact on EP decisions.  
 
Council: CoR opinions and ex-
post subsidiarity checks have 
higher impact on Council 
decisions. 
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Scenario No. 1: A Dynamic Status Quo 
CoR  
Member’s  
status 
No: changes to 
the CoR rules of 
procedure do not 
require EU Treaty 
change. 
- expert criteria 
added. 
consultation: more 
uniform opinions based 
on bottom up expertise 
 
 
subsidiarity: more 
uniform subsidiarity 
scrutiny based on bottom 
up expertise. 
 
increased visibility and 
communication 
capacity. 
Commission: more acceptance of 
opinions and expertise and 
therefore a higher profile for CoR 
Members.  
 
EP: more acceptance of opinions 
and expertise and therefore a 
higher profile for CoR Members 
more acceptance of opinions and 
expertise. 
 
Council: more acceptance of 
opinions and expertise and 
therefore a higher profile for CoR 
Members. 
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2.2 Scenario 2: LRA Assembly within/Associated with the 
European Parliament 
 
The second scenario assumes the CoR acting as a Local and Regional Assembly 
within the European Parliament. The EP would comprise both a sub-chamber of 
popularly elected members representing citizens and a sub-chamber giving voice to 
sub-national authorities. 
 
In such an environment, the CoR would give up its current status as a distinct 
advisory body in the EU architecture and the EU treaties would have to be 
amended for EU institutional set up, the decision-making procedures, the inter-
institutional balance and the CoR membership. 
 
As part of the EP, the CoR would adopt the name of the European Parliament and 
CoR Members would become CoR-MEPs, with a more permanent presence in 
Brussels. However, within the EP, the CoR would continue to operate as a distinct 
body and subnational territorial chamber. The merger would enable EU citizens to 
make a choice about their MEP and, indirectly, also the representation of 
subnational territorial politics at the European level. Citizens would not only be 
aware that they elect the representatives of the EP but also influence selection of 
the CoR-MEPs selected from the representatives of LRAs. 
 
The scenario assumes a more explicit federal structure in the representation of sub-
national authorities that provides more consistency between legislative and 
executive powers, as is the case in other federal structures. The assumption is based 
on the ongoing institutional development and the current and future growing 
coordination of policies in the EU, such as those in the area of economic 
governance, telecom and EU transport policy services. The (need for) further 
coordination is likely to trigger spill-over effects that future changes of the EU 
institutional architecture would address. 
 
Within the EP, the CoR would act as a sub-chamber of revision, passing legislation 
debated by the MEPs elected on the basis of universal suffrage. In that role, it 
would act as a prudent reviser considering subsidiarity and proportionality, but it 
would also develop expertise in the monitoring of EU legislative proposals within 
its remits. The scenario would not have an impact on the CoR's current role in 
formulating general, but also specific policy advice such as reacting to specific 
policy proposals, including tabling amendments to legislative proposals from the 
Commission with policy recommendations addressed to the EP. 
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2.2.1 Institutional Set Up 
 
The scenario has an impact on the internal and external set-up of the EP. 
Internally, the EP would become a bicameral institution with a double 
representation
36
. Externally, the bicameral legislature of the EU would become 
more explicit. The EP would be a lower house resting on both popular and 
subnational representation while the Council continues to act as an upper house 
representing the Member States. This would address the heterogeneous 
constitutional traditions and different types of territorial representation that exist 
within the EU Member States today. 
 
How could such an assembly work alongside the national assemblies and regional 
parliaments? The role and involvement of national parliaments in EU decision-
making varies significantly in the EU and affects their role in subsidiarity scrutiny. 
There is also a large variation in their cooperation with regional parliaments.
37
 The 
present scenario assumes a convergence of the Europeanisation of national 
parliaments and an increased coordination in the Conférence des organes 
spécialisés dans les affaires communautaires (COSAC). Bottom-up and top-down 
pressures would result in reform of COSAC, leading to a higher level of 
coordination and exchange of ideas.
38
 In view of strengthening multilevel 
governance and increasing regional parliamentary cooperation with COSAC, the 
CoR could serve as a bridge and go beyond consultation. 
 
2.2.2 Decision-making procedures 
 
The EP procedures following integration of the CoR define the internal policy 
space in which MEPs and CoR Members interact. The CoR can support the EP’s 
activity in its main areas of expertise and reinforce aspects such as subsidiarity 
monitoring and impact assessments of EU legislation. The CoR may also impact 
the external policy space of the ordinary legislative procedure in the EU. 
  
                                           
36
 Norway had a kind of semi-bicameral legislature with two chambers, or departments, within the same elected 
body, the so-called Storting. The department were called the Odelsting and Lagting and were abolished after the 
general election of 2009. According to Morten Søberg, there was a related system in the 1798 constitution of the 
Batavian Republic. 
37
 A. J. Cygan (2013) Accountability, parliamentarism and transparency in the EU: the role of national parliaments, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd. 
38
 Protocol 1, Article 9 and 10.  
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Internal decision-making 
 
The organisational structure of the CoR would be integrated within that of the EP. 
The new EP would resemble a semi-bicameral legislature with two chambers, 
where the CoR would maintain an independent plenary based on its distinct 
membership. The CoR commissions would be able to coordinate their work in the 
Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) and the EP Bureau. The representation of 
the political parties and national delegations in the EP and the CoR would overlap 
and reinforce both the political element and national elements in the EP. 
 
CoR Members would specifically pay attention to the territorial impact 
(subsidiarity and proportionality) of new legislation and its implementation. The 
territorial focus would enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EP and improve 
the legislative output. Following the preparatory work in the EP/CoR Committees, 
the legislative proposals, reports and opinions would be tabled in both the EP and 
the CoR plenary requiring a double majority.
39
 The vote in the CoR plenum would 
formally be confined to the issues of subsidiarity, proportionality and their 
implementation rather than any policy consideration, which would be limited. As a 
consequence, the CoR would become a mini-EP within the EP, paying close 
attention to the functions of the EP Committees of the Parliament dealing with 
regional and local matters.
40
 
 
External decision-making 
 
Having merged with the EP into a single institution, the CoR enjoys reinforced 
powers in the ordinary legislative procedure. The CoR's participation would ensure 
that policies take account of LRA realities at an early stage in the legislative 
process. The CoR Members of the EP, the so-called CoR-MEPs, would raise 
awareness and contribute to the prevention of problems that local and regional 
authorities experience when implementing EU policies. In other words, the CoR is 
expected to provide precise proposals on the basis of regional and local expertise. 
                                           
39
 Instead of applying the standard principle of simple or absolute majorities for the approval of legislation one could 
use concurrent majorities. A measure would pass in the EP if it obtains a majority in each of the two sub-chambers. 
This should reassure the LRAs that they will not be outvoted as a smaller chamber within the EP. Within each 
chamber the normal majority rule would apply and members would still face the imperative of convincing a 
sufficient number of fellow members to pass a measure. P. C. Schmitter (2000) How to democratize the European 
Union ... and why bother?, Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield.-85. 
40
 J. Loughlin (1997) Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions in: Jeffery (ed.) The regional 
dimension of the European Union : towards a third level in Europe?, London: Frank Cass. 
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This strengthened role would be particularly significant for those areas where the 
Treaties provide for mandatory consultation of the CoR. 
 
De facto, the CoR would reinforce its role in these areas alongside the co-
legislators, enjoying the right to table amendments to the EP plenary. The CoR 
would cooperate with the relevant committees and contribute to reaching a double 
majority, needed for approval of the opinion. Should the legislative procedure 
arrive at the Conciliation stage, the CoR might be represented in the EP's 
delegation to guarantee its prerogatives. The political groups in the EP would have 
shadow rapporteurs also among the CoR Members. The CoR-MEPs could thus 
become part of the trilogues (the three-party meetings) attended by representatives 
of the EP, the Council and the Commission.
41
 Owing to the ad-hoc nature of 
trilogues, the format of the CoR’s representation may vary. Nevertheless, as a rule 
they would involve a CoR MEP – which could be the CoR MEP rapporteur – when 
issues within the CoR’s remit would be discussed. 
 
The scenario has likely only limited impact on the extra parliamentary dimension 
of the consultation procedure and the consent procedure. It is noteworthy that, 
because of its integration in the EP, the CoR will have more impact on a number of 
important procedures such as the budgetary procedure, the appointment 
procedure and the conclusion of international agreements. The most visible 
would be the election of the President of the European Commission, the European 
Ombudsman and many others.
 42
 While informal, the impact of the integration 
between the CoR and the EP should not be underestimated as MEPs and CoR-
MEPs will be working together on a daily basis. 
 
Resources 
 
One key advantage is the synergies that a merger between the CoR and the EP 
entails. These synergies relate to the sharing of resources and assets. Following the 
2014 cooperation agreement between the CoR and the EP, the two would share and 
cooperate in the areas of administrative resources, communication and research.
43
 
The agreement strengthens the role and engagement of the CoR’s members in the 
                                           
41
 Assuming that the measure would be adopted in the third phase when the conciliation committee reaches a double 
majority in the EP-CoR, the institutional consequence being a defacto quadrilogue instead of a trialogue. The 
conciliation proposal would only be deemed adopted if there is QMV for the Member State fraction and a majority in 
the EP group and the CoR group.  
42
 Article 14(1), 17(7) TEU, Article 228 TFEU. 
43
 Cooperation Agreement Between the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels 
(05/02/2014). 
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EP activities within the EU legislative process. The CoR also occupies an adjacent 
building to the EP premises. Further integration between the CoR and the EP would 
result in more efficient use of EU resources. 
 
2.2.3 Inter-institutional Relations 
 
The consequences of this scenario on inter-institutional relations are described 
below. 
 
Cooperation with EP 
 
With the CoR integrating the EP, the formal cooperation agreement of 5 February 
2014 would become obsolete. The cooperation within the bi-cameral EP would 
become intra-institutional and part of the EP’s rules of procedure. The new rules 
would be adopted by the EP, acting by a double majority of its Members in both 
chambers of the new EP on subsidiarity issues, on territorial policies and structural 
funds.
44
 
 
Cooperation with the Council 
 
The CoR and the Council have not established a formal cooperation agreement. 
With the CoR integrated within the EP, this is no longer necessary and the 
relationship between EP and the Council would also govern the relationship 
between the CoR and the Council. That relationship would primarily be defined by 
the legislative procedures and the new Parliaments’ rules of procedure. 
 
Cooperation with the European Commission 
 
Following the CoR’s integration within the EP, the longer established formal 
cooperation based on the Protocol on Cooperation between the European 
Commission and the Committee of the Regions would become obsolete.
45
 To better 
reflect the new special partnership between the CoR and the Parliament, the most 
important elements of the protocol agreed in February 2012 would have to be 
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 Article 232 TFEU. European Parliament (February 2014) Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament: 7th 
parliamentary term. 
45
 See Art. 295TFEU and the Protocol on Cooperation between the European Commission and the Committee of the 
Regions. Brussels (16 February 2012). 
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incorporated in the Framework Agreement between the EP and the Commission.
46
 
The new Framework Agreement covers the scope, the relationship, the political 
responsibility, the constructive dialogue and flow of information, the cooperation 
regarding legislative procedures and planning, as well as the Commission’s 
participation in parliamentary hearings. The Framework Agreement would also 
need to fully appreciate the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's Protocol (No 2) 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
47
 
 
2.2.4 CoR Member Status 
 
Integration within the EP would bring significant changes to the method of 
constituting the CoR membership, the composition and possibly the size of the CoR 
of 350 CoR-MEPs. 
 
A successful merger requires three fundamental characteristics. First, to achieve 
greater legitimacy the CoR membership would need a stronger representative 
function. Moreover, the Members of the CoR would need to be directly 
accountable to the national associations of LRAs for their decisions and actions at 
the European level. Second, to maintain their independence with the EP, CoR 
Members would need to have stronger LRA identity that goes beyond loyalty to 
their respective political party group and differentiates them from the MEPs. 
Finally, to fulfil its mandate, the CoR would have to bring weight to the negotiation 
table. It would therefore require high-profile and stable membership, allowing for 
the development of local and regional expertise as well as EU decision-making. 
 
To maximise its effectiveness under this scenario, the CoR would need to reconcile 
direct legitimacy of the so-called third level of governance and the representation 
of the diversity of European LRAs with the elements traditionally associated with a 
strong and independent legislative chamber. Ideally, these elements are combined 
in an elected membership of a relatively small and independent legislative 
chamber characterised by a lower turnover with an internal organisation that 
balances expertise with party allegiance. 
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 Interinstitutional Agreements: Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the 
European Commission. L 304/47. Brussels (20/11/2010). 
47
 Committee of the Regions (2010) Follow-up to the Lisbon Treaty. Drafted by European Institute of Public 
Administration (Maastricht and Barcelona). Based on the reaffirmation of the LRA dimension and the CoR’s 
prerogatives in the Lisbon Treaty as well as the consideration of multilevel governance highlights the future 
reinforcement of the collaboration.  
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The CoR MEPs would be indirectly elected to the EP on a country by country basis 
by the respective associations of subnational authorities. Ideally, their composition 
and functions would have to be mapped out and harmonised over time as the CoR 
legislative power and visibility grows. CoR MEPs would ultimately be held 
accountable to the national associations of LRAs. Such electoral procedure would 
firmly anchor the CoR MEPs in the national LRAs and their preferences and 
interests. It would also guarantee the diversity of LRAs in Europe. As is currently 
the case, to encourage a low turnover, CoR MEPs would serve a term of 5 years 
similar to the EP and there would be no limit to the number of terms served. 
 
To further strengthen the CoR’s independence and legislative influence, its size 
could be further reduced. Traditionally, the cube-root-rule has been used to 
determine the ideal size of a legislative chamber with the number of representatives 
adding up to the cubic root of the proportions of the national chambers (+/- 10%). 
48
 
A smaller and more influential independent chamber would be more visible and 
also attract a higher profile membership. 
 
2.2.5 Recommendations 
 
Against the background of reconciling efficient and effective decision-making with 
injecting more LRA legitimacy in the EU law and policy making process, the 
scenario of a LRA Assembly within the European Parliament makes the following 
recommendations: 
 
 The redefinition of the European Parliament: Prepare an opinion on the 
future institutional architecture of the EU on the basis of the already close 
cooperation between the CoR and the EP laid down in the formal cooperation 
agreement of 5 February 2014 and this scenario. The opinion should be 
approved by a large majority of CoR Members. It would lay out the necessary 
changes, the policy options and argue strongly in favour of integrating the CoR 
as a sub-chamber of the EP. To start the conversation in Europe, publish the 
CoR opinion with the details of the vote and distribute the text widely among 
CoR Members, MEPs, the European LRAs, the Council, national ministries and 
other public authorities. 
 
                                           
48
 A. Lijphart (1999) Patterns of democracy : government forms and performance in thirty-six countries, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
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 Decision-making: Further strengthen the ties between the CoR’s six permanent 
commissions and their standing Committee counterparts in the EP. In addition 
to the 2014 CoR-EP cooperation agreement, this can be achieved formally and 
informally through inter-institutional exchanges, meetings of members at all 
levels, workshops and conferences. Most importantly, convince these EP 
standing Committees of the CoR’s unique expertise and their constructive 
contribution to their legislative work by offering information, issuing timely 
reports and opinions that could reduce the Committees' workload. Subsequently, 
the CoR would be regarded as a valuable partner in the areas of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and experience with implementation of European legislation. 
 
 Membership: Argue in favour of a replacement of the designation procedure 
with an electoral procedure for the CoR membership. The argument is based on 
the necessity to achieve greater legitimacy and accountability, to maintain 
independence and guarantee a value added to the EP. The CoR Members would 
be indirectly elected to the CoR chamber within the EP by the associations of 
subnational authorities that currently select and designate the CoR membership. 
The number of representatives would add up to the cubic root of the proportions 
of the national chambers (+/- 10%). The elections would be envisaged to be 
brought in line and take place at the same time as the European elections 
throughout the EU. To achieve such objective the CoR should strengthen its ties 
with all subnational European LRA associations. As a first step, the CoR would 
need to draw up a detailed map of their membership and their 
electoral/appointment procedures. Subsequently, the CoR would lobby the 
subnational association in favour of an electoral procedure for its members, their 
growing input in the European legislative process and their rising visibility. 
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2.2.6 Synoptic Table 
 
Scenario No. 2: LRA Assembly within/Associated with the European Parliament 
 TEU Changes 
(if needed)* 
Impact on the 
CoR and its 
prerogatives 
Impact on other EU institutions 
Overall 
institutional setup 
(as defined by the 
Treaties)  
Perhaps: new 
institution (EP). 
- TEU changes: Art. 
13), Title III. 
- TFEU changes: Part 
VI, (Chapter 1, new 
Section; Chapter 3 
deletion of CoR 
references), Art. 263, 
Art. 265, Art. 295. 
Strengthened 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Members 
in the new EP 
(consent 
procedure, 
bicameralism 
within EP.) 
- political 
assembly. 
 
EP: change in the structure and 
composition, as well as in its rules 
of procedures, change in 
legislative procedure to the extent 
that the CoR is now part of the 
EP. 
 
Council: change in legislative 
procedure and change in inter-
institutional agreements to the 
extent that the CoR is now part of 
the EP. 
 
Commission: change in 
legislative procedure and change 
in inter-institutional agreements to 
the extent that the CoR is now 
part of the EP. 
Decision-making 
procedures 
Yes: recognition of 
the CoR in the EP  
- TEU changes: Art. 
10, Art. 14. 
- TFEU changes: Part 
VI, Title I (Chapter 1, 
Section I; Chapter 3, 
Section 2, deletion of 
CoR references), Title 
VI (Chapter 2, Section 
2), Title II (financial 
provisions, Chapter 1-
4).  
- Removal of all 
references to 
advisory role of the 
CoR in TEU, TFEU 
Strengthened 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Members 
in the new EP 
(consent 
procedure, 
bicameralism 
within EP). 
- political 
assembly. 
 
EP: change in the structure and 
composition, as well as in its rules 
of procedures, change in 
legislative procedure to the extent 
that the CoR is now part of the 
EP. 
 
Council: change in legislative 
procedure and change in inter-
institutional agreements to the 
extent that the CoR is now part of 
the EP. 
 
Commission: change in 
legislative procedure and change 
in inter-institutional agreements to 
the extent that the CoR is now 
part of the EP. 
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Scenario No. 2: LRA Assembly within/Associated with the European Parliament 
Inter-institutional 
relations and 
existing ‘checks 
and balances’ 
Yes: new-inter-
institutional balance:  
- TEU and TFEU: 
removal of all 
references to CoR 
advisory functions 
new institution:  
- TEU changes: Art. 
13), Title IV. 
- TFEU changes: Part 
VI, (Chapter 1, new 
Section; Chapter 3 
deletion of CoR 
references), Art. 263, 
Art. 265, Art 295. 
 
Strengthened 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Members 
in the new EP. 
 
 
EP: change in the structure and 
composition, as well as in its rules 
of procedures, change in 
legislative procedure to the extent 
that the CoR is now part of the 
EP. 
  
Council: change in legislative 
procedure and change in inter-
institutional agreements to the 
extent that the CoR is now part of 
the EP. 
 
Commission: change in 
legislative procedure and change 
in inter-institutional agreements to 
the extent that the CoR is now 
part of the EP. 
CoR member’s 
status 
Yes 
- TFEU: Art 300(3). 
- new rules of 
procedure for the CoR 
or one set of 
integrated COR-EP 
rules of procedure.  
Reduction in 
the number of 
CoR-MEPs. 
 
EP: change in the structure and 
composition, as well as in its rules 
of procedures, to the extent that 
the CoR is now part of the EP  
  
Council: no specific impact  
 
Commission: no specific impact 
*Excluding technical changes, protocols and ad hoc solutions 
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2.3 Scenario 3: LRA Assembly within or associated with the 
Council 
 
The third scenario assumes that the CoR integrates the Council. The CoR and the 
Council have a number of elements in common. The two bodies represent the 
principle of territorial representation in the EU on a non-permanent membership 
basis. There are also political similarities with regional and ethno-linguistic 
specificities. Some of the LRAs already have an input on Council decision-making 
when issues concerning their competences are being dealt with, but this remains a 
minority.
49
 Depending on the Member State and internal constitutional order these 
competences differ. 
50
 The Council also plays an important role in the composition 
of the CoR. 
 
Integrating the CoR in the Council would raise the CoR’s status, with the 
Committee functioning as the guardian of the subsidiarity principle for the LRAs. 
In such environment, the CoR would give up its current status as a distinct advisory 
body in the EU architecture. The EU treaties would have to be amended with 
regard to the EU institutional setup, the decision-making procedures, the inter-
institutional balance and the CoR Membership. 
 
2.3.1 Institutional Set Up 
 
The scenario has an impact on the internal and external set up of the Council. 
Internally, the Council would incorporate the CoR in the Council working party 
structure. Currently, the EU Member States are the representatives of their citizens 
in the EU and the Council representation remains an essential part of political 
legitimacy at the EU level. The association of the CoR with the Council would lead 
the latter to represent both EU Member States and their subnational authorities. To 
compensate for the lack of local and regional territorial dimension and the higher 
homogeneity of legislative power within the Council
51
, this scenario assumes that 
                                           
49
 The strongest form appears to be the representation of the Belgian constituent federal entities that directly prepare 
the position Belgium will defend in the Council in areas that concern them, and whose ministers may actually 
participate in some Council formations, see in this respect l’accord de coopération du 8 mars 1994 entre l’Etat 
fédéral, les Communautés et les Régions relatif à la représentation du Royaume de Belgique au sein du Conseil des 
Ministres de l’Union européenne, as amended. 
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 Following the revision of article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty the Member States may delegate their vote in the 
Council to a ministerial representative of a sub-national tier of government. The only countries which have made use 
of this possibility in practice are Belgium, Germany and Austria.    
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 While the Lisbon Treaty has made the ordinary legislative procedure standard with the legislative power mostly 
shared between the Council and the EP, the Council up to this point has maintained a higher concentration of 
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the CoR would be associated at the level of working parties but that formal 
decision-making would occur at the level of the CoR plenary. The CoR would 
become a prudent reviser considering the core elements of its mandate, and in 
particular safeguarding the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality similarly 
to national jurisprudence where there are similar competences for national 
constitutional courts. 
 
Following the association with the Council, the CoR would maintain its name and 
distinct role. The role of the Council in the designation procedure of CoR 
membership would need to be altered. CoR membership would be established 
according to an indirect electoral procedure at LRA level in each Member State. 
The procedure would guarantee the CoR’s independence within the Council. A 
closer relationship between the sub-national LRA associations and the CoR would 
strengthen the CoR’s role in this respect. 
 
Externally, the scenario assumes a more explicit EU federal structure in the 
representation of sub-national authorities that provides more consistency between 
legislative and executive powers as is the case in other federal structures in the 
world. The assumption is based on the on-going institutional development and the 
current and future growing coordination of policies in the EU such as those in the 
area of economic governance, telecom services, as well as transport and energy to a 
certain degree. The (need for) further coordination is likely to trigger spill-over 
effects that future changes of the EU institutional architecture would address. 
 
Against this background, the EU would be legitimated by means of a bicameral 
legislature with the Council representing both national and subnational territorial 
interests and the EP giving voice to the interests of EU citizens. Within the 
Council, the CoR would act as an assembly contributing to legislation prepared in 
the working parties. In that role, it would act as a prudent reviser considering 
subsidiarity, proportionality and its general expertise on the implementation of 
legislation at the level of LRAs. In this sense, the CoR would be more of an 
institutional partner rather than a political partner for the Council. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
legislative power due to its limited membership relative to the EP. Moreover, there are a number of distinct 
institutional advantages for the Council to speak with a single voice vis-à-vis the EP. For a more extensive discussion 
see W. Van Aken (2012) Voting in the Council of the European Union: Contested Decision-Making in the EU 
Council of Ministers (1995-2010). Stockholm.   
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The Commission-CoR cooperation agreement would need to take account of the 
new association between the Council and the CoR.
52
 As part of the Council the 
CoR and the Commission would have to study whether the Commission-CoR 
cooperation agreement could stay in place or what elements could be maintained. 
Being associated with the Council, the CoR would gain relevance in the 
cooperation with the EP in the ordinary legislative procedure. The merger of the 
CoR into the Council would have no impact on the European Council, but it would 
bring the CoR closer to the impetus given by the European Council through its 
association with the Council. 
 
2.3.2 Decision-making procedures 
 
The Council remains the more-than-equal partner in EU decision-making. Its 
decisions are the result of negotiations among delegates receiving instructions from 
their capitals. Beyond the European level impact assessments, LRAs cannot gauge 
the consequences of these decisions in advance. The solution is more transparent 
decision-making, feeding the interests of territorial representation and their voice 
into the Council decision-making. 
 
Following the association with the Council, the Council's internal rules of 
procedure would frame the cooperation between the Council and the CoR. The 
ordinary legislative procedure would also gain legitimacy. Finally, a new avenue 
for the participation of regional and local authorities at EU level would be 
provided. 
 
Internal decision-making 
 
The new Council would move in the direction of a semi-bicameral legislature for 
the CoR core policy domains for which treaties provide for mandatory consultation. 
However, the CoR would maintain an independent plenary, largely related to the 
electoral status of its distinct membership. The CoR would complement the activity 
of some working parties on specific legislative proposals within the CoR’s remits. 
The CoR Commissions’ structure would work alongside the Council working 
parties in the area of obligatory consultation. The rules of procedure of the CoR and 
those of the Council working parties would need to provide for the new 
relationship. 
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 Protocol on Cooperation between the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels (16 
February 2012). 
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The association of the CoR Commissions with these working parties would occur 
through the participation of a CoR delegation alongside the 28 Member States and 
one Commission representative in the respective working party deliberations. The 
delegation would comprise a CoR Member assisted by experts from CoR staff. 
Following the preparatory work of Council working parties, involving a back-and-
forth coordination with the CoR, the proposals for Council's position would be 
tabled at the CoR plenary for matters related to its domain of competence, requiring 
a majority of votes. The CoR opinion would then be transmitted to the COREPER 
for finalisation and subsequently to the relevant Council formation. The increased 
subnational territorial focus would enhance the democratic legitimacy of the 
Council and ensure more attention to the territorial dimension of EU legislation. 
 
The Council Presidency would continue to chair the Council working parties, and 
the CoR would establish a close relationship in those areas of obligatory 
consultation. In other areas, such as those covered by the External and General 
Affairs Councils, the CoR would be involved at a later stage to allow for the 
development of its expertise. In the areas of facultative consultation, the CoR 
would help Presidencies to generate visibility of the Council's activities at sub-
national level. 
 
With the Council and the CoR associated, the CoR national delegations and 
Member States representations will become parallel actors within a single 
institution. Given their proximity, the CoR national delegations’ (particularly the 
chair and coordinator) and the Permanent Representations to the EU would benefit 
from regular contacts. 
 
External decision-making 
 
The CoR would gain a stronger say in the ordinary legislative procedure, where it 
would inject a territorial focus and the experience of legislative implementation at 
the level of the LRAs. This is particularly true for those areas for which the 
Treaties foresee obligatory CoR consultation.
 
The CoR Members would raise 
awareness and contribute to the prevention of problems that local and regional 
authorities experience when implementing EU policies. In other words, the CoR is 
expected to provide precise proposals on the basis of regional and local expertise. 
In those cases where the co-legislators cannot reach an agreement and a 
Conciliation Committee is convened, the CoR could be part of the Council 
delegation, particularly for acts in those areas where the Treaties provide for 
obligatory CoR consultation. 
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2.3.3 Inter-institutional Relations 
 
The consequences of this scenario on inter-institutional relations are described 
below. 
 
Cooperation with the Council 
 
With the CoR associated with the Council, the need for a cooperation agreement 
would become obsolete. Any cooperation with the Council would become part of 
that association and be intra-institutional. The cooperation would become part of 
the Council’s rules of procedure. In addition, the effects on the decision-making 
procedures of the new CoR-Council association would need to be spelled out in the 
EU Treaty. 
 
Cooperation with the EP 
 
Following an association with the Council, the formal cooperation agreement of 5 
February 2014 would need to be altered and take into account the new 
relationship.
53
 The sharing of resources and synergies would conflict with the 
separation of powers between the EP and the Council. 
 
Cooperation with the European Commission 
 
Following the CoR's association with the Council, the longer established formal 
cooperation between the European Commission and the CoR would become 
obsolete.
54
 To better reflect the new special partnership between the CoR and the 
Council, the most important elements of the protocol agreed in February 2012 
would have to be taken into account with respect to the association with the 
Council.
55
 The principle of separation of powers would potentially prevent any 
extensive cooperation between the Commission and the CoR in the domain of 
obligatory CoR consultation. 
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 Article 232 TFEU. European Parliament (February 2014) Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament: 7th 
parliamentary term. It would be difficult for the CoR to maintain its current relationship with the EP in view of a 
closer relationship with the Council. Hence, the cooperation agreement would need to be altered. 
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 See Art. 295TFEU and the Protocol on Cooperation between the European Commission and the Committee of the 
Regions. Brussels (16 February 2012). 
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 The closer relationship between the CoR and the Council will also influence the relationship between the EP and 
the Council and therefore the Interinstitutional Agreements between them.  
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2.3.4 CoR Member Status 
 
The LRAs have influence on EU policy making through their respective 
governments, their own structures in Brussels and more formally via the CoR. 
When the CoR was set up, it was left to the EU Member States to establish the 
criteria based upon which sub-national authorities would be represented and how 
they would be chosen. Usually, the associations of LRAs within each Member 
State draw up a list of candidates, to which the national government agrees. 
Subsequently, each Member State sends the list to the Council for adoption, which 
requires a unanimous decision.
56
 
 
From a perspective of separation of powers, re-enforcement of the EU’s territorial 
legitimacy and accountability, the designation procedure is problematic. It 
underlines the association between the Council and the CoR but it also lays bare 
one crucial weakness. The CoR Members and the representatives of the Council 
Member States are, from a strictly legal perspective, both accountable to the EU 
Member States.
57
 Simultaneously, it weighs on the CoR's independence and the 
requirement of a strong LRA representation vis-à-vis the Council. 
 
Prerequisites for a successful membership 
 
A successful association with the Council would require two fundamental elements 
to be enacted. First, to achieve greater legitimacy, the CoR membership would need 
a stronger representative function of LRA units. Moreover, the members of the 
CoR would need to be directly accountable to the national associations of LRAs for 
their decisions and actions at the EU level. Second, to fulfil its mandate, the CoR 
would have to be a strong and independent chamber bringing weight to the 
negotiation table. It would require a high profile and stable membership with a low 
turnover, allowing for the development of local and regional expertise as well as 
EU decision-making. 
 
Size 
 
Under a scenario of an LRA assembly associated with the Council, the CoR 
Members would be indirectly elected. Ideally, CoR membership would be of no 
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  Committee of the Regions (2009) The selection process for Committee of the Regions members. Procedures in the 
Member States, available at  
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more than 200 members. The selection would be operationalised by applying the 
square root value for allocating the number of seats in the CoR. The scenario 
proposes three groups of countries (large, middle-sized and small) based on the 
relative size of their population. Each cluster of countries would have a similar 
average of citizens per seat but the average would be higher for the large countries 
and lower for the small countries. The allocation procedure would bring the voting 
power of the CoR national delegations in line with the weighted votes of the 
Member States under a qualified majority procedure in the Council.
58
  
 
Electoral Procedure 
 
The associations of subnational authorities would elect their respective CoR 
Members. Such electoral procedure would firmly anchor the CoR Members in the 
national LRAs and their preferences and interests. It would also guarantee the 
diversity of electoral representation. One crucial aspect would be the stronger ties 
between the national LRA associations and their representatives at the EU level as 
CoR Members would ultimately be held accountable to the national associations of 
LRAs. To encourage the territorial representation instead of party allegiance, 
candidates would be elected from a party-list proportional representation. 
 
The electoral procedure would allow the CoR to attract more high-profile 
candidates and allow them to develop expertise on EU policy-making. This would 
benefit visibility, independence and improve the balance between the CoR and the 
Council. The ministers acting in the Council are usually well known nationally 
because they serve as government leaders and ministers in their respective domain. 
Similarly, the CoR membership would be based on representing subnational 
interests, thereby reinforcing the subsidiarity principle. 
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 Some have suggested an alternative system based on a so-called split vote giving LRAs a part of the weighted vote 
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Resources 
 
The CoR and the Council represent the principle of territorial representation on a 
non-permanent basis with members hailing from their constituency. However, in 
contrast to the CoR, the Council and the Member States can count on a strong 
administration in the Council Secretariat and the Member States’ national 
administrations. With its diverse membership, the CoR cannot count on similar 
administrative resources for all its members. 
 
2.3.5 Recommendations 
 
Against the background of reconciling efficient and effective decision-making with 
feeding more LRA legitimacy into the EU legislative process, the scenario of a 
LRA Assembly associated with the Council makes the following recommendations: 
 
 Redefinition of Council: The CoR would need to explore in more detail the 
necessary changes and policy options that association with the Council would 
entail. To this end, the CoR would organise conferences, seminars and 
workshops to gain knowledge about how it could work together with the 
Council in more detail. The results of these more research-oriented activities 
would be published widely, generating a debate at the EU level and within the 
Member states on how association with the Council would benefit the LRAs. 
 
 Decision-making: prepare the ground for establishing informal and formal ties 
between the CoR and Council. Given the importance of the Presidency as the 
chair of the Council working parties, reinforce established contacts or approach 
the Presidency Trio. The CoR would subsequently offer its expert services in its 
core policy domains to seek more synergies with the 18-month programme of 
the Presidency trio. The respective CoR national delegations could play the role 
of frontrunners for the organisation of informal and formal inter-institutional 
exchanges. Most importantly, convince the Presidency and the Council 
Secretariat of the CoR's unique expertise and its constructive contribution to the 
legislative work by offering information, issuing timely reports and opinions 
that could reduce their workload. Subsequently, the CoR is likely to be regarded 
as a valuable partner in the areas of subsidiarity, proportionality and experience, 
with the implementation of European legislation. 
 
 Membership: Argue in favour of a replacement of the designation procedure 
with an electoral procedure for the CoR membership. The argument would be 
substantiated by added EU legitimacy and accountability on the basis of direct 
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LRA representation with a bigger influence, lower turnover and hence a high 
profile membership. As the CoR gains in prominence it is likely that over time 
the membership would also become more prominent and that LRAs would 
select more high profile candidates or candidates who get involved on a long-
term basis. The 200 CoR Members would be indirectly elected to the CoR. To 
achieve such objective the CoR should strengthen its ties with all subnational 
European LRA associations. As a first step, the CoR would need to draw up a 
detailed map of their membership and their electoral/appointment procedures. 
Subsequently, the CoR would lobby with a long-term view the associations of 
subnational authorities making the case for an electoral procedure. The case for 
an electoral procedure at the subnational level would benefit from the resulting 
growing input in the European legislative process and the rising visibility of the 
CoR Members on the European stage. 
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2.3.6 Synoptic Table 
 
Scenario No. 3: LRA Assembly within/associated with the Council 
 TEU Changes 
(if needed)* 
Impact on the 
CoR and its 
prerogatives 
Impact on other EU institutions 
Overall institutional 
setup (as defined by 
the Treaties)  
Perhaps: redefine 
institution (Council). 
- TEU changes: Art. 13), 
Title IV. 
- TFEU changes: Part VI, 
(Chapter 1, new Section; 
Chapter 3 deletion of CoR 
references), Art. 263, Art. 
265. 
Strengthened 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Members 
in the Council. 
Council: legislative procedure 
and composition. 
 
EP: legislative procedure, inter-
institutional agreements  
 
Commission: legislative 
procedure, inter-institutional 
agreements. 
 
Decision-making 
procedures 
Yes: recognition CoR in the 
Council. 
- TEU: Art. 16. 
- TFEU: Part VI (Chapter 1, 
Section 3; Chapter 3: 
deletion of CoR references, 
deletion of all references to 
advisory functions). 
- Removal of all references 
to advisory in TEU, 
TFEU. 
Strengthened 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Members 
in the Council. 
 
Council: legislative procedure 
and composition. 
 
EP: legislative procedure, inter-
institutional agreements. 
 
Commission: legislative 
procedure, inter-institutional 
agreements. 
 
Inter-institutional 
relations and existing 
‘checks and balances’ 
Yes: new inter-institutional 
balance: 
- TEU: Art. 16. 
- TFEU: Part VI (Chapter 1, 
Section 3; Chapter 3: 
deletion of CoR references, 
deletion of all references to 
advisory functions), Art. 
295. 
- Removal of all references 
to advisory in TEU, 
TFEU. 
Strengthened 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR 
Members.  
Council: legislative procedure 
and composition. 
 
EP: legislative procedure, inter-
institutional agreements. 
 
Commission: legislative 
procedure, inter-institutional 
agreements. 
 
CoR member’s status Yes 
- TFEU: Art 300(3). 
 
Strengthened 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Members 
in the Council. 
Council: change in the structure 
and composition, as well as in 
its rules of procedures, to the 
extent that the CoR is now part 
of the Council. 
 
EP: no specific impact. 
 
Commission: no specific 
impact. 
*Excluding technical changes, protocols and ad hoc solutions. 
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2.4 Scenario 4: The CoR as a Territorial Platform 
supporting the work of the European Commission 
 
The fourth scenario assumes the CoR working as a territorial platform and 
supporting the work of the Commission. With the CoR and the Commission 
cooperating closely together, the scenario underlines the expert dimension of the 
CoR membership in the decision-making process, and particularly in the pre-
legislative phase and in the procedure for delegated and implementing acts
59
. 
Moreover the scenario assumes a reinforced Community method in relation to the 
CoR’s political nature, its consultative powers and the member status. 
 
2.4.1 Institutional set-up 
 
The scenario has an impact on the internal and external set up of the Commission 
and the CoR with regard to the CoR’s new role in the pre-legislative phase and the 
procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts. 
 
Internally, the Commission would involve the CoR in the pre-legislative phase 
across the Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) in areas related to the CoR core 
competences. Such cooperation in the pre-legislative phase would enhance the 
CoR’s expert function with respect to subsidiarity and proportionality and impact 
assessments. This stronger cooperation would affect the relationship between the 
Commission and the CoR. 
 
As to the procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts, following a 
CoR request the Commission would invite the CoR representatives to participate in 
the meetings when draft delegated and implementing acts are being discussed. The 
CoR would participate as an observer with speaking rights. The CoR would 
subsequently issue an opinion on the consultation and the act on the table. As a 
result, the CoR’s expert function would be significantly enhanced. 
 
Externally, the scenario would enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy by 
guaranteeing that decisions are taken closest to EU citizens and expressing the 
opinions of a variety of subnational interests. It would also bring added 
transparency to the procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts. 
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 As a second step the CoR could also be involved in the post legislative phase for monitoring the implementation of 
EU legislation. 
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The scenario assumes no changes to the so-called political dialogue
60
 between the 
Commission and the national parliaments owing to the involvement of the CoR at 
an earlier stage. On the contrary, the CoR acting as a territorial platform supporting 
the work of the Commission in the pre-legislative phase would facilitate political 
dialogue and reduce the number of concerns about compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity.
61
 
 
2.4.2 Decision-making Procedures 
 
The Commission takes the lead in the pre-legislative phase when drawing up 
legislative proposals and in the procedure for adopting delegated and implementing 
acts. Beyond the impact assessments carried out by the Commission and those the 
CoR would carry out on its own initiative, the LRAs cannot measure the 
consequences of legislative proposals in advance. Involvement of the CoR in the 
pre-legislative phase and the procedure for adopting delegated and implementing 
acts would provide a solution and inform concerns with respect to the territorial 
impact at an early stage into the legislative process. 
 
The pre-legislative phase and the procedure for adopting delegated and 
implementing acts define the policy space in which Commission lawmakers and 
CoR Members would operate. Involvement of the CoR would provide a new and 
early avenue for the participation of regional and local authorities and strengthen 
the legitimacy for EU citizens of the Commissions legislative proposals. 
 
The Pre-legislative Phase  
 
Access to the Commission services during the conception of EU legislation would 
significantly increase the possibilities for the CoR’s concerns to be reflected in 
draft legal acts. The CoR’s participation would ensure that policies take account of 
LRAs' views and concerns at the drafting stage. This would not require significant 
EU Treaty or institutional changes.
62
 Instead, the Commission would draft 
internal guidelines for all DGs working on LRA matters to involve the CoR in the 
pre-legislative phase. The guidelines would also apply to the work of the six 
permanent CoR Commissions and be incorporated in a new Protocol on 
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 Protocol 1. 
61
 Protocol 1, Article 9 and 10.  
62
 Perhaps treaty changes with policy area mention. 
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Cooperation between the European Commission and the Committee of the 
Regions.
63
 
 
At first, these new guidelines would only apply to those policy areas where the 
Commission is required to consult the CoR. The content of the CoR-Commission 
consultation would be added to the documentation of the dossier when the proposal 
is introduced in the EP and the Council. In policy areas not belonging to the CoR’s 
core competences but with an anticipated impact on the LRAs such as 
enlargement or Neighbourhood Policy the Commission could invite the CoR 
representatives following a reasoned request to participate in the meetings within 
the Commission services during the conception of EU legislation. 
 
The procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts 
 
The Lisbon Treaty reformed the traditional Comitology procedures to the extent 
that it introduced a distinction between delegated and implementing acts. These 
acts may directly affect the governance of LRAs with regard to project financing 
and the enforcement of delegated and implementing acts. With the CoR, as a 
territorial platform, supporting the Commission, CoR representatives would be 
invited to participate in meetings where draft delegated and implementing acts are 
being discussed. During the discussion, the CoR could systematically check against 
the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, respect for multilevel governance 
and insert more legitimacy into the procedure.
64
 
 
 Delegated Acts 
 
In the area of delegated acts, the Commission is authorised to supplement or 
amend non-essential elements of a basic legislative act by means of adopting 
a non-legislative act.
65
 When the Commission prepares delegated acts it 
needs to ensure simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of 
relevant documents to the EP and the Council.
66
 The Commission also needs 
to carry out appropriate and transparent consultations, including at expert 
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 The comitology procedure may have a significant impact upon LRAs. The procedure has been criticised for its 
lack of transparency and democratic legitimacy on subsidiarity grounds. A. J. Cygan (2013) Accountability, 
parliamentarism and transparency in the EU: the role of national parliaments, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd.-
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 Art. 290 TFEU. 
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 Common Understanding on Delegated Acts. Brussels (04/04/2011). 
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level. In this process, the EP and the Council exercise direct supervision over 
the Commission and have the right to object to an individual act or to revoke 
the delegation. However, they cannot impose a mandatory consultation of 
representatives of the Member States. 
 
As a rule, the Commission systematically consults experts. These expert 
consultations include observers with the EP having the possibility to attend 
relevant meetings of national experts preparing the delegated acts. The 
Commission provides the EP with full information on these meetings in the 
preparatory and implementation stage. The Commission would extend these 
prerogatives to the CoR, acting as a territorial platform in its support. The 
CoR’s participation in the expert groups in the course of the preparation of 
the delegated act would allow the CoR to feed LRA concerns into the 
debate.
67
 
 
 Implementing Acts 
 
Implementing acts ensure the uniform implementation of EU law in the 
Member States.
68
 Implementing acts remain subject to discussion and 
approval in Comitology Committees. According to different Comitology 
procedures, the Member States are involved in the committees to supervise 
the Commission to varying degrees while the EP’s involvement is more 
peripheral.
69
 The Commission would extend these prerogatives and the CoR 
would participate in an observer capacity beyond the current practice. The 
participation would provide a platform to the CoR to express its opinion 
about the impact of these acts on LRAs. The CoR’s opinions would be 
integrated into the documentation for the meeting. 
 
 Both for delegated and implementing acts, the CoR would need to develop 
internal expertise and designate participants to the meetings. These 
participants would be CoR Members speaking on behalf of the CoR and 
supported by CoR staff.
70
 Alternatively, highly specialised CoR Members of 
the six standing Commissions could be selected but their participation would 
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 Committee of the Regions (2010) Follow-up to the Lisbon Treaty. Drafted by European Institute of Public 
Administration (Maastricht and Barcelona), p. 41. 
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 Art. 291 TFEU. 
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 Art. 290 TFEU and Art. 291(3) TFEU. In contrast to delegated acts where the Council is involved for 
implementing acts the control is exercised by the Member states.     
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  Committee of the Regions (2010) Follow-up to the Lisbon Treaty. Drafted by European Institute of Public 
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need to be decided on the basis of expertise rather than political grounds. The 
nature of the expertise would need to be judged against the neutrality of the 
Commission, and respect for the Community method. Further, it would be 
anticipated and reflected in the composition of the CoR. These elements 
would be reflected in internal guidelines for the choice of this designated 
CoR participants. 
 
2.4.3 Inter-institutional Relations 
 
The consequences of this scenario on inter-institutional relations are described 
below. 
 
Cooperation with the European Parliament 
 
The scenario under which the CoR acts as a territorial platform supporting the work 
of the Commission has little influence on the CoR-EP relationship. The new 
cooperation agreement strengthening the political relationship between the CoR 
and the EP would remain in force as it would not be affected.
71
 Perhaps when 
renewed it could take into account the CoR's role in the pre-legislative phase and 
the procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts as well as with regard 
to the exchange of information between the two bodies. The EP would also 
welcome the CoR related documents in the dossier. 
 
Cooperation with Council 
 
The CoR and the Council have not established a formal cooperation agreement. 
The CoR acting as a territorial platform supporting the work of the Commission has 
no influence on the CoR-Council relationship as such. As to the procedure for 
adopting delegated and implementing acts, it is important to note the clear 
distinction between the Member States acting and the Council. For delegated acts, 
the Council is involved while for implementing acts, even though the comitology 
regulation is adopted by Council and EP, the Member States exercise the control 
over the Commission's implementing powers.
72
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Cooperation with the Commission 
 
With the CoR acting as a territorial platform supporting the work of the 
Commission, formal cooperation would need to be strengthened. The cooperation 
protocol would need to be updated and renewed to take into account the CoR’s new 
role in the pre-legislative phase and the procedure for delegated and implementing 
acts.
73
 The protocol would make a reference to the new internal guidelines on the 
pre-legislative phase for all DGs involved in LRA matters. These guidelines would 
set the criteria and the procedures on how to involve CoR Members in the pre-
legislative phase and the procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts. 
The guidelines would also make reference to the documentation and the manner in 
which they would be shared. At first, these guidelines would only apply to those 
policy areas where the Commission is required to consult the CoR. Only in a 
second stage other policy areas could be envisaged, giving the CoR sufficient time 
to further develop its expert function. 
 
2.4.4 CoR Member Status 
 
The scenario has no influence as such on the composition of the CoR membership. 
It assumes, however, a high level of in-house expertise and a need for uniform 
decision-making capacity. Also, the expert element of the CoR membership would 
become an important element in addition to the party and the country 
characteristics of the CoR membership. 
 
Expert Function 
 
To improve the expertise of the CoR membership, the designation procedure would 
need to be altered at the subnational level. More specifically, in addition to the 
criteria of political party, gender and territorial balance, the selection procedure 
would need to take policy expertise into account. On the basis of these criteria the 
subnational associations would draw up a list of candidates that would be 
subsequently submitted to the national government for decision. The national 
governments would accept the list of candidates and forward it to the Council for 
adoption with a unanimous decision confirmation.
74
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The expert-related selection criteria for making up the candidacy list can be added 
on the basis of matching the Commission’ longer term priorities, the medium-term 
Commission initiatives and if possible the consultative procedure of the CoR with 
the required expertise. This would allow the candidate list also to include a 
selection on the basis of specific expertise that can be brought to the CoR assembly. 
In practice, this can be achieved through improving the ties between the CoR and 
the associations of LRAs in the Member States. The CoR would be well placed to 
communicate the Commission’s agenda to the local level and bring LRA expertise 
to the EU level. As such, the CoR would also gain in visibility at the level of the 
associations of subnational authorities. 
 
Uniform decision-making capacity 
 
The heterogeneity of the CoR membership often results in an output legitimacy gap 
with policies at times representing the lowest common denominator. In the past, the 
diversity of the CoR’s membership has often brought internal cleavages to the fore 
risking the capacity of the CoR to speak with a coherent and single voice. The 
present scenario assumes a stronger expert function for the CoR acting as an 
advisor in the pre-legislative phase and the procedure for adopting delegated and 
implementing acts. The scenario's objective is to improve the interest of LRAs and 
incorporate their concerns at an early stage in the legislative procedure. 
  
The heterogeneity and the output legitimacy gap of the CoR can be reduced by 
adjusting the CoR’s rules of procedure75. More specific, more uniform, swift and 
effective action would greatly benefit the CoR’s expert function in the pre-
legislative phase and the procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts. 
It would also allow the CoR to produce more uniform opinions according to the 
level of the LRAs as internal cleavages based on competences and level of 
subnational interest are reduced. It would also make CoR membership more 
valuable and attractive to the Members as output legitimacy of the CoR would rise, 
with ensuing higher impact and visibility for its Members. 
 
Resources 
 
To develop an extensive expertise function requires staff and other types of 
resources. The CoR administration has to make do with more limited resources 
compared to the EU institutions. In this context, resort to ICTs could significantly 
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increase the CoR's capability to draw on LRAs' experience and channel it to the EU 
institutions. 
 
2.4.5 Recommendations 
 
Against the background of reconciling efficient and effective decision-making with 
feeding more LRA legitimacy into the EU legislative process or policy making, the 
scenario of a LRA Territorial Platform supporting the Commission makes the 
following recommendations: 
 
 Involvement in the pre-legislative phase and the procedure for adopting 
delegated and implementing acts: Explore within the CoR the arguments why 
the CoR would need to be involved in the pre-legislative phase and the 
procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts. These arguments 
would form the basis for the necessary changes and the policy options the CoR 
would enact to functioning as a territorial platform supporting the European 
Commission. 
 
 Decision-making: Make preparations for closer cooperation between the CoR 
and the Commission establishing informal and formal ties. Simultaneously 
lobby the Commission to be invited in the pre-legislative phase and the 
procedure for adopting delegated and implementing acts. Most importantly, 
convince the Commission of the CoR’s unique expertise and its constructive 
contribution to the legislative work by offering information, issuing timely 
reports and opinions that could reduce the Commission’s workload. 
Subsequently, the CoR is likely to be regarded as a valuable partner in the areas 
of subsidiarity and proportionality and experience with implementation of 
European legislation. 
 
 Membership: Strengthen the ties with all subnational European LRA 
associations and draw up a detailed map of their membership and their 
electoral/appointment procedures. Subsequently, lobby the associations of 
subnational authorities in favour of introducing an additional criterion on the 
basis of expertise for designating CoR membership. Lay out the reasons why 
adding such criterion would be beneficial for the LRAs and the associations and 
how they would benefit from the CoR's role as a territorial platform supporting 
the work of the Commission. 
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2.4.6 Synoptic Table 
 
Scenario No. 4: The CoR as a territorial Platform supporting the work of the European 
Commission 
 TEU Changes 
(if needed)* 
Impact on the CoR and its 
prerogatives 
Impact on other EU 
institutions 
Overall institutional 
setup (as defined by 
the Treaties)  
Limited treaty 
change: 
participation 
requires only 
change of TFEU. 
Art. 291 and most 
likely no change to 
Art. 307, Art. 305, 
Art. 263, Art. 8, 
protocol on 
subsidiarity. 
consultation: expansion 
of competences to 
reinforced comitology 
procedure. 
 
subsidiarity: expansion of 
competences to reinforced 
comitology procedure. 
 
informal facilitator 
 
Commission: new inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
EP: follow up of inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
Council: potential for the 
setup of inter-institutional 
agreement on information 
sharing in certain policy 
domains. 
Decision-making 
procedures 
Limited treaty 
change: 
participation 
requires only 
change of TFEU 
Art. 291 and most 
likely no change to 
Art. 307  
consultation: expansion 
of competences to 
reinforced comitology 
procedure  
subsidiarity: expansion of 
competences to reinforced 
comitology procedure 
informal facilitator 
 
Commission: formal 
cooperation in the legislative 
procedure and new inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
EP: follow up of inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
Council: no specific impact. 
Inter-institutional 
relations and existing 
‘checks and balances’ 
Limited treaty 
change: 
participation 
requires only 
change of TFEU. 
Art. 291 and most 
likely no change to 
Art. 307, Art. 295. 
consultation: expansion 
of competences to 
reinforced comitology 
procedure. 
 
subsidiarity: expansion of 
competences to reinforced 
comitology procedure. 
 
informal facilitator 
 
Commission: new inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
EP: follow up of inter-
institutional agreement. 
 
Council: potential for the 
setup of inter-institutional 
agreement on information 
sharing in certain policy 
domains. 
CoR member’s status No: changes to the 
CoR rules of 
procedure do not 
require EU Treaty 
change   
consultation: expansion 
of competences to 
reinforced comitology 
procedure  
subsidiarity: expansion of 
competences to reinforced 
comitology procedure 
Commission: new inter-
institutional agreement 
allowing CoR Members to 
fulfil their new work better. 
 
EP: no specific impact. 
 
Council: no specific impact. 
*Excluding technical changes, protocols and ad hoc solutions 
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2.5 Scenario 5: A Third Legislative Chamber representing 
the LRAs 
 
The fifth scenario assumes that the CoR would act as a third legislative chamber 
representing the LRAs in a European Senate. The CoR would become a new EU 
institution and a territorial chamber next to the EP and the Council. Under this 
scenario the EU takes on the more explicit federal structure of a constitutional 
union mirroring a ‘United States of Europe’ with different types of government 
providing more consistency.
76
 The more federal structure represents the citizens in 
the EP, the Member States in the Council and the LRAs in the EU Senate. The 
legislative decision-making would rest with these three chambers. The Commission 
would maintain its right of initiative and its current executive role. 
 
In such environment the European treaties would have to be significantly amended, 
designing a new institutional balance between legislative and executive decision-
making. The Commission would increasingly resemble a government held 
accountable by a three-house legislature, with the CoR acting as an influential 
upper house. The CoR would have a new name (the European Senate, the EU 
Senate or simply the Senate).
 
It would influence policy, guarantee institutional 
stability and represent a diversity of European collective constituent units that an 
institution based on universal suffrage (one person, one vote) cannot represent. The 
CoR Members (the European Senators) would be indirectly elected among the 
European LRAs. The CoR would not initiate legislation but act as a chamber of 
revision passing legislation approved by the EP and Council with eventual veto 
powers in an up-or-down vote. In this role, it would act as a prudent facilitator and, 
when needed, delay legislation. However, the European Senate would need to be an 
efficient and effective upper chamber to prevent the EU decision-making from 
becoming too burdensome. The scenario takes this into account in the decision-
making procedures and the parameters of the CoR membership. 
 
2.5.1 Institutional Set Up: The design of the parliamentary 
institution 
 
The creation of upper houses to represent local and regional interest is not unique. 
It follows a trend in institutional design where the number of upper houses of world 
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parliaments has been rising.
77
 All 20 federal parliamentary systems in the world 
have an upper house
78
, next to a representation of the people in the lower house. A 
tricameral system is however quite rare.
79
 Yet it can be argued that a European 
Senate representing various LRAs and a European Parliament representing the 
people is actually fully in line with this international trend. The third chamber is 
however required to also give proper weight to the special status of the still 
sovereign member states within the EU through the Council. 
 
How then could the CoR acting as a European Senate differentiate itself from the 
other EU institutions, particularly the EP and the Council? In answering this 
question, the scenario considers two options: (a) a symmetric and egalitarian 
tricameralism; and, (b) asymmetric and subordinate tricameralism. In both 
options the level of (a-)symmetry or (non-)egalitarian tricameralism would depend 
on the composition of the European Senate and the level of autonomy of the 
constituent LRAs. The representation of the LRAs in the EU Senate would be key 
without losing the capacity for EU decision-makers to act effectively. 
 
According to the institutional design of symmetric and egalitarian tricameralism, 
the CoR would be one of three legislative chambers exercising similar powers and 
functions. The CoR would revise and could delay legislation, influence policy and 
have the power to request that the Commission propose legislation. The legislative 
initiatives would need the approval from both the EP and the Council. The CoR 
acting as a European Senate would also be able to consider financial legislation that 
was passed by the other two chambers.
80
 
 
The CoR's main role would be to revise legislation in its core policy domains that 
are tabled in the EP and the Council. Given the importance of the EU’s budget in 
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the areas of agricultural and regional policy, the CoR would have a say in the area 
of the EU’s budgetary legislation passed by the EP and Council. 
 
2.5.2 Decision-making Procedures 
 
The scenario of the CoR acting as a European Senate would have a significant 
impact on the decision-making procedures and in particular on the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The scope of the European Senate’s law-making powers 
would differ depending on whether it would be equal or subordinate to the EP and 
the Council. 
 
Option 1: Three equal chambers: symmetric and egalitarian tricameralism 
 
Under the European egalitarian tricameralism, the European Council continues to 
set the general political direction of the Union, while the Commission has the right 
of legislative initiative. The EP, the Council and the Senate may request the 
Commission to submit a proposal if they deem it appropriate. The ordinary 
legislative procedure would involve the EP, Council and the Senate as co-
legislators. As a first step, the areas where the three chambers jointly adopt 
legislation would only involve the domains for which the Treaties provide for CoR 
obligatory consultation. For other policy domains currently under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, the EP and the Council would continue to be the sole co-
legislators.
81
 In this new structure, the CoR acting as the European Senate considers 
legislative proposals and has an amendment right within strict time limits when the 
proposals are introduced in the EP and the Council. 
 
More specifically, the modalities of the ordinary legislative procedure place the 
EP, the Council and the EU Senate on an equal footing. The three institutions adopt 
legislative acts at first or second reading. Inter-cameral disagreement triggers the 
convening of a Conciliation Committee with the EP, Council and Senate appointing 
some of their members to serve on a joint committee and hammer out a 
compromise law for each house to adopt.
82
 During the conciliation phase, the 
Commission would act as a facilitator between the three chambers. 
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Option 2: A Subordinate European Senate: Asymmetric Tricameralism as a 
more realistic scenario 
 
Subordinate tricameralism assumes that the European Senate would be ancillary to 
the EP and the Council with lower levels of legislative activity, but scrutinising the 
majority of EU legislation. Instead of fulfilling the role of a full co-legislator, the 
European Senate would be a chambre de reflexion et de dialogue enjoying only 
limited legislative power. It would influence policy by engaging in dialogue with 
the EP and the Council and suggest amendments that combine argument and 
revision, intervention and accommodation, pressure and withdrawal. Nevertheless, 
in the legislative phase the MEPs and Member States’ would have the last word. 
 
Asymmetric tricameralism assumes that the European Council continues to set the 
general political direction of the Union, while the Commission maintains its right 
of initiative. The modalities of the ordinary legislative procedure involve the EP, 
Council and the EU Senate on those legislative proposals currently within the 
CoR’s remit adopted jointly by the three chambers. However, while the EP and 
Council are equal co-legislators, the EU Senate has only a minimal formal 
legislative role. This could take the form of the CoR acting as an EU Senate 
scrutinising Commission proposals before they are submitted, possibly taking 
account of the CoR's amendments, to the Council and the EP. Alternatively, the 
European Senate would suggest amendments during the first reading only. 
Downstream, the Senate would be requested to give its consent and would enjoy a 
right to veto within strict time limits. In this system, the EP and the Council can 
overrule the EU Senates’ opinion with a persisting majority vote at the end of the 
second reading. In that event, the Senate could only delay legislation. 
 
2.5.3 Inter-institutional Relations: influence 
 
A clearer separation of powers is essential in the inter-institutional balance and 
cooperation among all EU institutions (the EP, the Council, the Senate, the 
Commission and the European Council). Such separation of powers would make it 
easier for each EU institution to be held accountable. The strength of tricameralism 
would lie in the capacity of the CoR acting as a European Senate to check the 
actions of the elected EP and the Member States in the Council. 
 
Cooperation with the Commission 
 
The Commission would become a European government indirectly elected by EU 
citizens with the outcome of the European Parliamentary elections having a large 
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influence as is currently underway for the selection of the Commission President. 
The European government would have a fully-fledged economic and finance as 
well as foreign minister. This government would be accountable to the EP, Council 
and the European Senate. The Senate would have a degree of oversight in the 
selection of the College of Commissioners with a tri-cameral confirmation hearing 
of the Commission President. The role of the European Senate would be limited to 
the confirmation procedure. As a result, the Commission government would be 
invested by and legitimated at all levels of representation, i.e. the EU citizens, the 
European LRAs and the EU Member States. 
 
Obviously, these new procedures would result in a far-reaching revision of the 
formal cooperation agreement with the Commission, reinforced sharing of 
information and a stricter separation of inter-institutional assets to guarantee the 
independence of the European Senate. 
 
Cooperation with the European Council 
 
The CoR acting as a European Senate would have no impact on the institution and 
functioning of the European Council setting the general political direction of the 
Union with the Commission having the legislative initiative. Nonetheless, the 
European Council could consult the European Senate in its expert capacity on 
matters directly relating to LRAs. 
Cooperation with the EP and Council 
 
The strength of tricameralism would lie also in the capacity of the European Senate 
to check the actions of the other two chambers, the Council and EP.
83
 Provided the 
European Senate would be an equal partner, it could amend and veto legislation 
adopted by the other chambers. The co-legislative powers would guarantee that the 
three houses would check and balance one another. In a more subordinate advisory 
role, the European Senate would only delay passages of laws. Specific treaty 
provisions would empower the European Senate to revise, reconsider or delay 
legislation. However, the existence of a persisting vote in the EP and Council 
would ultimately prevail and allow for the rejection of the EU Senate’s veto. Under 
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the two options the Senate’s prerogatives of checks and balances would contribute 
to institutional continuity and the integrity of the European treaties. 
 
Tricameralism would result in a far-reaching revision of the formal EP cooperation 
agreement, reinforced sharing of information and a stricter separation of inter-
institutional assets to guarantee the independence of the EU Senate from the EP. It 
would require a cooperation agreement with the Council, including information 
sharing. To guarantee the independence of the European Senate, a strict separation 
of inter-institutional assets (offices, proper budget, personnel, research and 
documentation, etc.) would need to be guaranteed. 
 
2.5.4 CoR Member Status: Organisation 
 
When the CoR was set up, it was left to the EU Member States to establish the 
criteria for which collective units would be represented and how they would be 
chosen. As a rule subnational LRA associations draw up a list of candidates and the 
national governments agree to the list of candidates. Subsequently the Member 
States send the list to the Council for adoption with a unanimous decision.
84
 In 
short, the Member States control admittance to the CoR. 
 
From a perspective of separation of powers and reinforcement of the EU’s 
territorial legitimacy and accountability, the designation procedure for the CoR 
membership is problematic in a scenario where the CoR acts as a European Senate. 
The internal organisation of the European Senate would have to balance expertise 
with political party allegiance. 
 
The European Senate would have a maximum of 200 members, elected uniformly 
by the associations of subnational authorities in the Member States.
85
 The Senators 
would have a renewable mandate with a similar term to the European Parliament. 
Elections would be held simultaneously with the EP. 
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Size and Composition 
 
The CoR acting as a European Senate would have a maximum of 200 Senators 
explicitly recognising the unequal size and identity of the LRAs within. The 
scenario proposes three groups of countries (large, middle-size and small) based on 
the relative size of their population. Each cluster of countries would have a similar 
mean number of citizens per seat but the average would be higher for the large 
countries and lower for the small countries. 
 
Apart from respecting the diversity principle, limiting the size of the CoR has a 
distinct number of advantages. First, a smaller European Senate is more likely to be 
effective in countering arguments about the EU becoming too large with a third 
chamber. Second, a smaller legislative chamber is likely to be more independent 
and guarded from state capture of vested interests. The objective of the European 
Senate is the territorial representation of European LRAs above other types of 
representation. It would counterbalance the direct representation of the popular 
majorities in the EP and the Member States in the Council. Third, a smaller 
European Senate either subordinate or equal to the EP and Council would attract 
more high-profile candidates sufficient to guarantee the Senates’ independence and 
visibility. 
 
Indirect Elections 
 
The European Senate would be conceived as representing self-governing 
municipalities, localities, cities, regions and provinces. These subnational units 
have acquired their level of autonomy and self-governance as a result of a 
longstanding process and a carefully crafted balance with other levels of 
government. The European LRAs would guard their prerogatives in the EU Senate 
as counterbalance to the more centripetal EP and Council at the heart of the EU. In 
other words, the LRAs in the European Senate would protect the federal 
representative principle of the LRAs on the basis of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
 
To guarantee the counterbalance to the popular majority represented in the EP and 
the EU Member States raison d’état in the Council, a European Senate would have 
to draw its representation from a subnational range of European collective entities. 
Against this background, the legitimacy of the CoR membership would be served 
by an electoral instead of appointment procedure. 
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General elections in the Member States would determine the membership of 
associations of subnational authorities. Subsequently, these associations would 
function as an electoral college and draw up a list of candidates for the European 
Senate. The members of the associations of LRAs in the Member States would 
subsequently elect their preferred candidates to the European Senate. As a result of 
this procedure, Senators would have to hold office at the LRA level and be 
accountable to their respective LRA and subnational LRA association. Preferably, 
the electoral rules to be applied by the LRA associations in the different Member 
States would be harmonised. 
 
Following the indirect electoral procedure, the membership of the Senate is likely 
to be more stable with a lower turnover. This would allow the members of the 
Senate to develop political experience at the European level and visibility in the EU 
legislative process. It would also allow them to develop more harmonious 
preferences and function more effectively. 
 
Organisation 
 
The European Senate’s value added for checks and balances and the importance of 
the role of protecting local and regional interests would rest with a self-standing 
institution that directly represents the LRAs. A transparent, simple and resilient 
committee system would encourage such independence, raising the policy 
influence on the legislative process and strengthening the institutional treaty 
stability of the Union.
86
 The Senator’s party loyalty to extra-parliamentary 
leadership would weigh on the Senates’ Committee system but it would not fully 
replicate the partisan structure present in the plenary, the EP or potentially the 
Council. Instead, the indirect election, the strong committee system and the 
stronger bipartisan character would institute a European Senate that ultimately 
safeguards and gives voice to the European territorial representation on the basis of 
the subsidiarity and proportionality principle.
 87
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2.5.5 Recommendations 
 
Against the background of reconciling efficient and effective decision-making with 
feeding more LRA legitimacy into EU policy-making, the scenario of a third 
legislative chamber representing the LRAs implies the following recommendations: 
 
 A new EU institution: Prepare an opinion or resolution about the future 
institutional architecture of the EU. The opinion or resolution should be 
approved by a large majority among the CoR members. The document should 
lay out the policy options and argue strongly in favour of the set-up of a 
European Senate. Subsequently, publish the opinion with the details of the vote 
and distribute the text widely among the European LRAs and EU institutions to 
launch a debate on the sufficient and necessary changes. 
 
 Decision-making: Project a higher level of decision-making capacity and 
develop further a unique expertise in preparation of a potential convention and 
treaty change. This would make the CoR more credible when arguing in favour 
of the expansion of its legislative powers. As a first step, strengthen the unique 
expertise and the collective action of the CoR Members and take a clearer 
position in the area of its core competences when drawing up opinions. 
Simultaneously, develop a close relationship with the LRAs and subnational 
association. The role of the CoR Members and National Delegations is crucial 
as they are the go-between for the CoR and the subnational LRA associations. 
They should convince their respective association to aggregate their LRA 
expertise and information in the CoR while strengthening the CoR’s role as the 
preferred EU policy channel for the associations of subnational authorities. As a 
second step, the CoR needs to mobilise and present its aggregate LRA policy 
function and expertise to the EP, Commission and Council. It would then 
improve its position to argue of more legislative powers at the European level. 
At a more technical level, develop in-house ICT expertise or solicit outside IT 
expertise to build an expert platform that allows for the uploading, distribution 
and the aggregation of data among CoR Members, the LRAs and their 
associations. 
 
 Membership: Argue in favour of a replacement of the designation procedure 
with an electoral procedure for the CoR membership. The process leading up to 
the change of the procedure ideally should be bottom-up and the key players in 
that process are the subnational LRAs. Therefore, the CoR should strengthen its 
ties with all subnational LRA associations. These associations would not only 
elect CoR Members but would also hold these members to account. The process 
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would increase the legitimacy of CoR membership at the level of citizens and 
collective subnational units, increase the visibility and influence of CoR 
Members on the EU legislative process. 
 
2.5.6 Synoptic Table 
 
Scenario No. 5: A Third Legislative Chamber Representing the LRAs 
 TEU Changes 
(if needed)* 
Impact on the 
CoR and its 
prerogatives 
Impact on other EU institutions 
Overall institutional 
setup (as defined by 
the Treaties)  
Yes: new institution (EP). 
- TEU changes: Art. 13), 
Title IV (new Section). 
- TFEU changes: Part VI, 
(Chapter 1, new Section; 
Chapter 3 deletion of CoR 
references), Art. 263, Art. 
265. 
- Co-decision 
with full 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Core 
competences 
following a 
consent 
procedure for 
the CoR. 
EP: legislative procedure, inter-
institutional agreements. 
 
Council: legislative procedure, 
inter-institutional agreements. 
 
Commission: legislative 
procedure, inter-institutional 
agreements. 
Decision-making 
procedures 
Yes: recognition CoR as a 
third Chamber:  
- TEU changes: Art. 10, 
Art. 14, Art. 16 
- TFEU changes: Title VI 
(Chapter 1, Part I; Chapter 
3, Part 1, deletion of CoR 
references), Part VI 
(Chapter 2, Section 2), 
Title II (financial 
provisions, Chapters 1-5), 
Art. 263, Art. 265 
- Removal of all 
references to advisory in 
TEU, TFEU 
- Co-decision 
with full 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Core 
competences 
following a 
consent 
procedure for 
the CoR. 
- political 
assembly. 
EP: legislative procedure, inter-
institutional agreements. 
 
Council: legislative procedure, 
inter-institutional agreements. 
 
Commission: legislative 
procedure, inter-institutional 
agreements. 
Inter-institutional 
relations and existing 
‘checks and balances’ 
Yes: recognition of the 
Cor as a Third Legislative 
Chamber: 
- TEU changes: Art. 10, 
Art. 14, Art. 16. 
- TFEU changes: Title VI 
(Chapter 2, Section 2; 
Chapter 3, Part 1, deletion 
of CoR references), Part 
VI (Chapter 2, Section 2), 
Title II (financial 
provisions, Chapters 1-5), 
Art. 263, Art. 265 Art. 
- Co-decision 
with full 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Core 
competences 
following a 
consent 
procedure for 
the CoR. 
 
EP: legislative procedure, inter-
institutional agreements. 
 
Council: legislative procedure, 
inter-institutional agreements. 
 
Commission: legislative 
procedure, inter-institutional 
agreements. 
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295. 
- Removal of all 
references to advisory in 
TEU, TFEU. 
CoR member’s status Yes  
- TEU: Art. 10. 
- TFEU: Art 300(3). 
- new rules of procedure. 
- designation procedure: 
optimal size of the CoR 
composition. 
- Co-decision 
with full 
legislative 
powers for the 
CoR Core 
competences 
following a 
consent 
procedure for 
the CoR. 
- increased 
visibility and 
communication 
capacity. 
EP: no specific impact. 
 
Council: no specific impact. 
 
Commission: no specific 
impact. 
*Excluding technical changes, protocols and ad hoc solutions 
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